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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE
PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORT INDUSTRY
Cym H. LowvL*
INTRODUCTION
In the economic history of American civilization, it has been a common phenom-
enon for employees to join in concerted efforts to rectify what is perceived to be
their employer's oppressive rule. In light of the common assertion that professional
athletes are little more than "peons"1 or "slaves,"' and the fact that professional
athletics has increasingly assumed the trappings of ordinary business enterprise,3 it is
hardly surprising that unionization has been steadily creeping into the arenas of the
professional team sport industry.4 This "creep" has, in fact, reached the point that
recognized exclusive collective bargaining agents-in the form of players associations
-currently represent most players in collective bargaining with the club owners.5
* Member of the Indiana Bar and the firm of Dutton, Kappes and Overman of Indianapolis. This
article is from a book by John C. Weistart and Cym H. Lowell entitled The Law of Sports to be pub-
lished by the Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., and is used here by permission. All rights reserved.
' See American League Club of Chicago v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441, 465, 149 N.Y.S. 6, xg (Sup. Ct. 1914);
117 CoNo. REc. 15451 (1971) (remarks of Senator Ervin); Krasnow & Levy, Unionization and Professional
Sports, 51 GEo. L.J. 749, 755 n.2o (1963) [hereinafter cited as Krasnow & Levy].
' See Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 409 (2d Cir. 1949) (Frank J., dissenting); Hearings Before
the Senate Antitrust Snbcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85 th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2,
at 2653 (1957) [hereinafter cited as 1957 Hearings]; Schneiderman, Professional Sport: Involuntary
Servitude and the Popular Will, 7 GONZAuA L. REv. 63, 69 (1971); Note, The Balance of Power in
Professional Sports, 22 MAINE L. RE.. 459, 469 (970) [hereinafter cited as Balance of Power]. The
relationship between players and their respective clubs has also been described as being "paternalistic,"
Shulman & Baum, Collective Bargaining in Professional Athletics-The NFL Money Bowl, 50 CHnc. B.
Rae. X73, 175 (1969); Hearings Before the Special House Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Seas. 22 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Labor Relations in Professional
Sports], with the owners viewing the players as "dumb jocks." Brown, The Owners Can Be Tackled Too,
SPORTs ILLUI-RsATED, Mar. 22, 1971, at 2o. In this regard, it is interesting that during the baseball
strike in the spring of 1972, the spokesman for the players said that "[t]he reat issue is the owners'
attempt to punish the players for having the audacity not to settle and for having the audacity not to
crawl." Washington Post, Apr. 4, 1972, § D, at 1, cols. 3-4.
aSee Pierce, Organized Professional Sports and the Antitrust Laws, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 566, 6o6 (1958)
(a "unique type of business"). See also Seligman, The Higher Economics of Baseball, FORTUNE, Apr.,
1957, at 135; Krasnow & Levy, supra note I, at 750-54; Note, Superbowl and the Sherman Act: Pro-
fessional Team Sports and the Anti-Trust Laws, 8r Hay. L. REv. 418 (1967); Note, Monopsony Power
in Manpower: Organized Baseball Meets the Antitrust Laws, 62 YALE L.J. 576, 58o (1953). See generally
H.R. REs. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); Rottenberg, The Baseball Players' Labor Market, 64
J. POL. EcoN. 242 (1956). The financial details of the National Football League are considered in Labor
Relations in Professional Sports, supra note i, at 94-102.
'The advent of collective bargaining in professional football is described in Shulman & Baum, supra
note 2; see also Krasnow & Levy, supra note i. The scope of the National Football League Players
Association is considered in Labor Relations in Professional Sports, supra note i, at ii.
1 See, e.g., Labor Relations in Professional Sports, supra note i, at 91; see also Wall Street Journal,
Aug. 23, 1967, at i, col. x. It is noteworthy, however, that the players associations have never thought
of themselves as a union, but rather as an "association." See Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Hotse Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 104 (1964) [herein-
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The emergence of these players' "unions" has been much less than a precipitous event,
since they have been a periodic characteristic of the professional team sport scene
since the very early days of organized baseball It is only in the recent past, how-
ever, that collective bargaining agents have been an ongoing feature of the sports
industry.
The emergence of a countervailing power in this particular market has, to date,
had relatively little impact on the structure of the organized professional sports. In
fact, the "labor situation" in professional sports is still only in its infancy. As time
goes on, however, the parties appear to be relentlessly headed down a path that can
lead them only into the same "thicket" of problems that has for many years beset
the labor-management relationship in other areas of American industry. As this
path is traveled, the parties will increasingly find themselves immersed in the labor
law. This is certainly predictable, but as yet it seems that the parties have not fully
appreciated-or at least that appreciation has not been articulated-the hurdles that
will almost certainly appear.
The purpose of this article will be to outline the types of problems which seem
to be present in the professional team sport industry when it is covered by the veil
of the labor laws. What will basically flow from this discussion is, simply, that when
the owners and players enter the arena of formalized collective bargaining, they
literally start a new ball game. In that arena, their relationship and conduct is
governed by a vast scheme of statutory and decisional rules which are the product
of some forty years of experience in other areas of American commerce. These rules
may cause quite unexpected changes to occur in the sporting leagues, and they will,
to be certain, put the owner-player relation upon a new foundation
after cited as 1964 Hearings]. Regardless of how a collective bargaining agent chooses to identify itself,
it is, of course, a statutory "labor organization," see National Labor Relations Act § 2(5), 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(5) (970), if it meets the prescribed definition. See note 25 infra.
0 It has, thus, been observed that "players have [periodically] organized unions which thrived for a
fleeting moment, made their impact on . . . [sports] law, and then faded into history." H.R.
REP. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 172 (1952). An interesting discussion of the fate of one such union
is contained in Seymour, St. Louis and the Union Baseball War, 51 Mo. HIsT. REV. 257 (1956).
One representative of the players has, for example, expressed the opinion that "we have never really
seriously considered" the labor laws or their impact. z964 Hearings, supra note 5, at 104.
'Perhaps the easiest example of the new relationship is evidenced by the frequent reports that club
owners, or their agents, assemble their players for the purpose of discussing various matters pertaining
to their relations, see, e.g., Washington Post, Apr. 8, 1972, § E, at s, col. 1-3, and that the player
representatives on the various teams are more often than not traded by their club owners. See Labor
Relations in Professional Sports, supra note x, at ig; Brown, supra note 2, at 19-20. Though such aqcions
are perfectly permissible absent the labor laws, they are clearly impermissible once the parties enter the
collective bargaining arena, bound as it is by the various strictures of the national labor policy. One of
those policies is embodied in section 8(a) (s) of the National Labor Relations Act, which provides, broadly,
that the employer shall not "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7," 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(i) (197)-that is, the rights to self-organization, to bar-
gain collectively, and to engage in other concerted activities for their own aid and protection. National
Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (970). Thus, when owners or their agents assemble their
players to discuss labor relations, they may well be committing a section 8(a)(i) unfair labor practice.
The owner is, however, entitled to a free speech right under the labor laws, inasmuch as Congress added
section 8(c) in the Taft-Hartley amendments in 1947 to provide that an employer is free to express any
view so long as it "contains no threat of force or reprisal or promise of benefit." National Labor Re-
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Once in the collective bargaining arena, owners can no longer refuse to bargain
over particular contract or bylaw provisions by invoking the shibboleth that it would
bring the sport to an early grave, because any item relating to wages, hours, or other
terms or conditions of employment is a mandatory subject of bargaining about which
the owners have a duty to bargain in good faith. The players need no longer take
any part of their "condition" as a "fact of life," for they have within their grasp the
power to make the owners bargain about its continued existenceY There is,
however, a concomitant to that new power; once within the "friendly confines" of
the labor law, individual players may not complain about the terms and conditions
negotiated by their bargaining agent, for they are all equally bound by its actions.
This basic labor policy of submitting the will of the minority to that of the majority
may bear most heavily upon the so-called superstars, for once the majority of average
ballplayers realize the power in their hands, they may use the interests of the stars
for the furtherance of their own self-interest.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the advent of collective bargaining is
that all courts should in the future treat disputes in this industry the same as they
do disputes in the steel industry-that is, they should leave the parties to their
remedies under the labor laws, either before the NLRB or the courts themselves.'0
In short, though the professional team sport industry may present collective bargaining
problems in some rather unique, perhaps even sui generis, circumstances, they are,
nonetheless, labor problems and should be treated as such.
I
COVERAGE OF THE NLRA
The first issue that must be addressed when considering the relationship be-
tween a particular industry and the labor laws is, of course, whether the coverage
of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is broad enough to include the in-
dustry in question. It has long been a familiar rule that inasmuch as the NLRA is
lations Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § i58(c) (1970). With respect to the trading of player representatives,
the owner may then be violating section 8(a) (3), which makes it an unfair labor practice to discriminate
so as to encourage or discourage union membership. National Labor Relatons Act § 8(a) (3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1970).
These comments simply evidence the fact that having submitted themselves to the labor process,
owners and player representatives alike must familiarize themselves with the strictures contained therein.
This familiarization has apparently taken place, judging by the NLRB charges that have been filed.
See Labor Relations in Professional Sports, supra note i, at 14, 15, 26, 93. See also Washington Post,
Apr. 8, 1972, § E, at i, cols. 1-3. That NLRB decisions have been relatively infrequent is, perhaps,
evidence that NLRA strictures are sufficiently in hand to be used by both sides as either shield or
sword.
' It is important to note that in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), Mr. Justice Marshall observed,
in his dissenting opinion, that the Court has rendered the collective efforts of ballplayers "impotent." Id.
at 292. This is, with all due respect, a slightly overbroad conclusion. As will be developed herein,
players associations are no more or less "impotent" than are any other labor organizations.
"0Labor Relations in Professional Sports, supra note x, at 87. It has been noted, however, that any
such remedy may be somewhat illusory. See 1957 Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 2, at 2654. Though that
objection may have some appeal, it has never dampened the attitudes of courts considering labor dis-
putes in other industries.
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based upon the commerce clause of the Constitution, its coverage is coextensive with
that clause's reach.'1 Thus, every industry that is in or affects interstate commerce
is subject to the provisions of the N-LRA'
In order to conclude that the NLRA covers the professional team sport industry,
therefore, it need only be found that their activities are involved in interstate com-
merce. Though this may at one time have been an issue of merit, its further con-
sideration lacks even academic interest in light of the Supreme Court's recent pro-
nouncement that "[p]rofessional baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate
commerce."'13 A similar determination had already been made with regard to foot-
ball,'4 basketball,' 5 boxing,' hockey,' 7 and golf.' It can, therefore, be said with some
confidence that the NLRA's coverage does, in fact, include the professional team
sports.'9
Even though the NLRA is so applicable, the NLRB has the statutory power to
decline to assert jurisdiction where, in its opinion, the impact of a particular in-
dustry on interstate commerce is not so "sufficiently substantial to warrant the
exercise of its jurisdiction . ... ."' Although the Board has exercised this discretion
over some professional sporting industries, 21 it seems clear that it will not do so with
regard to the organized team sports. This view is given probative weight by the
"
1 See NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 6oi, 607 (1939); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. i (1937); Pappas v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 125 F. Supp. 343, 344 (N.D. Il. 1954).
"INLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 6oi, 607 (1939).
"Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (972); see also American League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, i8o N.L.R.B. 189 (z969); 1957 Hearings, pt. x, supra note 2, at 47. See generally Martin, The
Labor Controversy in Professional Baseball: The Flood Case, 23 LAB. L.J. 567 (1972). A similar result
has been reached with regard to amateur softball. See Amateur Softball Ass'n of America v. United
States, 467 F.2d 312 (ioth Cir. X972).
'" Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 334 (1957)-
1 Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1024 (972); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basket-
ball Club, 468 F.2d xo64 (2d Cir. 1972); Saunders v. National Basketball Ass'n, 348 F. Supp. 649
(N.D. Ill. 1972); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971);
Washington Professional Basketball Corp. v. National Basketball Ass'n, 147 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y.
1956).
" United States v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc., 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
"Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v.
Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 26x (D. Mass. 1972); Peto v. Madison Square Garden, 1958 Trade Cas. 69,xo6
(S.D.N.Y. x958).
I'Deesen v. PGA, 358 F.2d 165 (9 th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966); Blalock v. Ladies
Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 126o (N.D. Ga. 1973).
10 See New York State Div. of Human Rights v. New York-Pennsylvania Professional Baseball League,
36 App. Div. 2d 364, 320 N.Y.S.2d 788, 799 (1971) (Cardamone, J., dissenting); 1957 Hearings, pt. 1,
supra note 2, at 47 ("we have to recognize that professional football now is under the National Labor
Relations Act"). Although it may have at one time been believed that the antitrust exemption enjoyed
by some professional sports exempted them all from NLRA coverage, this view has been rejected on
numerous occasions and need no longer be grounds for argument. The theory and its rejection are
considered in Hoffman, Is the NLRB Going to Play the Ball Game?, 2o LAm. L.J. 239, 242-43 (1969).
"°National Labor Relations Act § 14(c)(I), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(i) (970). Thus, the Board has
declined jurisdiction over lawyers, Evans & Katz, Ltd., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 197 (1972), and doctors, Almeda
Medical Group, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. No. 57 (1972) •
" The most recent instance of this discretionary exercise is Yonkers Raceway, Inc., x96 N.L.R.B. No. 8x
(1972), where the Board declined to assert its jurisdiction over harness racing because it lacked sufficient
impact on interstate commerce. See also Centennial Turf Club, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. No. 97 (1971).
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Board's recent decision in American League of Professional Baseball Clubs,22 a case
involving baseball umpires, where it held that professional baseball is an industry
in or affecting commerce and that, therefore, it is subject to NLRA coverage and
NLRB jurisdiction.2- The Board observed that its policy of encouraging collective
bargaining through protection of employee rights to self-organization and choice
of representation would be best fulfilled by asserting its jurisdiction and subjecting
any labor dispute to resolution under the NLRA2 4
Though it is never wise to predict the result of as yet undecided and unlitigated
cases, there should be little remaining uncertainty as to the coverage of the NLRA
and the jurisdiction of the Board with regard to the professional team sports.
Not only is the coverage of the Act and the jurisdiction of the Board broad enough
to cover the players themselves, 5 but it will also include all other employees in the
industry from bat boys to maintenance men. 6
II
CHALLENGING THE RESULTS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNDER
THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Having passed the initial hurdle of the applicability of the labor laws to the
industry, it is next necessary to examine the antitrust laws as they apply to collec-
tive bargaining. This inquiry is of singular importance because of the current pro-
pensity of disappointed athletes to challenge various provisions of their contracts
or their treatment--of which the Flood v. Kuhn litigation27 is currently the most
prominent example-as being in violation of the antitrust laws. If such challenges
are more often than not successful, it would be an exercise of some futility to consider
further the labor laws, since the collective bargaining process would, in that event,
be pre-empted by the federal antitrust laws. Thus, it is necessary to find some means
22 i8o N.L.R.B. 189 (1969).
l Id. at 192-93. See also 35th ANNUAL REPORT oF TIM NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONs BoARD 22-26
(970). It is to be noted, however, that member Jenkins was of the opinion that the Board should decline
to assert its jurisdiction over professional baseball. i8o N.L.R.B. at 194.
24 18o N.L.R.B. at 192-93. See generally Hoffman, supra note 19, at 239; Balance of Power, supra
note 2, at 478.
-' With regard to coverage, question might also arise as to whether the players associations are
"labor organizations" within the meaning of the NLRA. See NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 36o U.S. 203
(1959). Section 2(5) defines a labor organization to include "any organization . . . which exists for the
purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers, concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages,
rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." National Labor Relations Act § 2(5), 29
U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970). Thus, any employee group which deals with employers about wages and
other conditions of employment is a labor organization. In American League, the League also argued
that the umpires' organization there in dispute was not a labor organization since the umpires were
allegedly "supervisors." The Board, however, held that the umpires were not supervisors and that
the organization was a labor organization since it existed for the purpose of dealing with employers
about wages and conditions of employment, i8o N.L.R.B. at 192-93; see also Krasnow & Levy,
supra note i, at 772-74, indicating that the players associations would also meet the statutory test.
"
6 See i8o N.L.R.B. at 193.
"'Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). For the background of Flood's suit, see Flood, My Rebellion,
SPoRTs ILu.u'rRan, Feb. 1, 1971, at 24.
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of accommodating the antitrust and labor laws as they apply to the professional team
sport industry?
An antitrust attack upon contract provisions or individual treatment raises, in
the labor context, the primary question of whether the action complained of
presents an issue of labor law which is generally the subject of an antitrust exemp-
tion29 The parameters of that exemption have been the subject of several relatively
recent Supreme Court cases that have evolved a fairly clear geometry. In United
States v. Hutcheson,"° the Court made the general holding that union activity will
generally be immune from antitrust attack."1 This general rule was then hedged a
bit in Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local Union 3, IBEW, where the Court said that the
exemption would be lost to a union that aided "non-labor groups to create business
monopolies and to control the marketing of goods and services."'3 The line that the
Court has thus drawn "is the line between the product market and the labor
market."3 4 Probably the most important of the cases, however, is Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 5 where an employer brought suit to invalidate a
provision in its collective bargaining agreement which restricted the hours during
which it could operate. This case is significant because it did not involve a ques-
tion of a conspiracy amongst labor and non-labor groups, but rather whether an
agreement is immune from attack by one of its signatories because of the labor
exemption from the antitrust laws-precisely the type of attack a disappointed
28With regard to the antitrust laws and professional sports, it has been said that "the antitrust
laws are aimed at preventing certain types of restrictive agreements between competing businesses. Yet
the concept of organized team sports requires in some instances the kind of cooperation which the
antitrust laws forbid." Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89 th Cong., ist Sess. 2 (z965). In earlier testimony, it had been observed
that the antitrust laws were necessary for players only to the extent that they had no control over their
own contract provisions. See Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Comm. on the Judidary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. iio (x964). These views serve only to reinforce
the fact that some means of harmoniously resolving the competing policies of the antitrust and labor
laws is necessary for the orderly expansion of collective bargaining in professional sports. This is, indeed,
the very question that Mr. justice Marshall said in Flood v. Kuhn should be explored. 407 U.S. at 294.
The exploration herein should provide an easily applied geometry with which to decide player antitrust
challenges to provisions of future collective bargaining agreements.
2 The basis for this exemption is in sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § i7 (1970); 29
U.S.C. § 17 (1970); 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970). See '957 Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 2, at 2658. The antitrust
laws are, of course, fully applicable to the organized professional sports, see Radovich v. National Foot-
ball League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049
(C.D. Cal. 1971), with the exception of baseball. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (972); Toolson v. New
York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1957). Complete antitrust application has been the subject of several
bills in the Congress. See S. 2616, H.R. 11937, H.R. 11224, H.R. 11033, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
It is noteworthy, however, that none of these proposals contains a specific provision exempting "any
right to bargain collectively," as did a similar bill in 1957. See Z957 Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 2,
at 2656-57.
8o 312 U.S. 219 (194i).
"I1d. at 233-37.
82 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
83 d. at 8o8. See also UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1965).
"Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in
Peonage, 81 YALF. L.J. I, 26 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Jacobs & Winter].
88381 U.S. 676 (1965).
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athlete would make." This raised, the Court said, the question of whether the
challenged provision was
so intimately related to wages, hours and working conditions that the unions' suc-
cessful attempt to obtain that provision through bona fide arm's length bargaining
in pursuit of their own labor union policies, and not at the behest of or in combina-
tion with non-labor groups, falls within the protection of the national labor policy
and is therefore exempt from the Sherman Act.37
Finding the challenged provision to be so related, the Court held it to be immune
from antitrust attack 3
Jewel Tea, thus, mandates that a collective bargaining agreement provision is
exempt from the antitrust laws where it relates to "wages, hours and working con-
ditions," and its purpose is to effectuate a beneficial policy of the union and not the
employer. It is significant, however, that the term "wages, hours and working con-
ditions" as used by the Court in this context does not refer solely to mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining. This was made clear in Jewel's companion case United Mine
Workers v. Pennington,3 9 where a coal company had, by cross complaint, challenged
a wage agreement as being part of a conspiracy between the Mine Workers and the
larger coal companies to drive the smaller operators out of business4 Since a wage
agreement would have clearly been a mandatory subject of bargaining,41 the Court
observed that "compulsory" subjects of bargaining are not automatically exempt from
antitrust scrutiny, though it also said that it would give "great relevance" to the
Board's demarcation of the bounds of the duty to bargain!
2
Justice Goldberg added significant concurring opinions in both Jewel Tea and
Pennington, though he dissented from the Court's opinion in Pennington. He felt
that all mandatory subjects of bargaining should be immunized because any other
solution would leave all collective bargaining provisions open to attack, inasmuch
as the Court's opinion in Pennington would allow the necessary conspiracy finding
to be made whenever a union and employer collaborate or discuss the impact of their
Id. at 689.
8 Id. at 689-9o .
Is ld. at 691. These cases are all considered in some detail in Comment, Labor Law and Antitrust:
So Deceptive and Opaque are the Elements of These Problems, 1966 Dusa LJ. 191.
381 U.S. 657 (1965).
'oId. at 659-61.
"Mandatory subjects of bargaining are those that relate "to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment." NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). The
subjects which are mandatory are chronicled and discussed in C. Moms, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw
389-424 (197o) [hereinafter cited as Moalus].
42 38r U.S. at 714-15. It is to be noted, however, that in American Federation of Musicians v. Car-
roll, 39x U.S. 99 (1968), the Court seems to have been unsure of the mandatory subject of bargaining's
relationship to the antitrust laws. It said, per Mr. Justice Brennan, that "[e]ven if only mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining enjoy the exemption-a question... upon which we express no view. . ." Id. at iio.
This hesitation seems to belie the dear expressions in Pennington and is, therefore, in no way probative
of the view of Justice Goldberg that the exemption is bounded by the mandatory subject of bargaining
rubric. See note 43 infra and accompanying text.
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agreement upon competing employers, since that finding could "be inferred from the
conduct of the parties."43 Just as Justice Goldberg seemed to have had too litde
faith in the ability of triers of fact to discern the presence in fact of actual con-
spiratorial animus, so did he place too much faith in the "mandatory" label. It seems
clear, as the Court observed in Pennington, that "there are limits to what a union
or an employer may offer or extract in the name of ... [mandatory subjects of
bargaining], and because they must bargain does not mean that the agreement
reached may disregard other laws."44 Justice Goldberg's opinion does, however, ex-
press the very tangible fear that the power to make antitrust attacks upon collective
bargaining agreements may well undermine the authority of a bargaining agent, a
subject which will be shortly explored.
When a disappointed professional athlete45 challenges a provision of his collec-
tive bargaining agreement through the antitrust laws, therefore, his suit will be
dismissed unless he can prove that the agreement provision did not relate to "wages,
hours and working conditions" and that it was negotiated by his bargaining repre-
sentative as a co-conspirator with the owners in pursuit of non-player oriented bene-
fits. Since, moreover, the labor exemption is not limited to compulsory subjects of
bargaining, the courts need not burden themselves with making that determination.4
So long as it is shown that the provision in question relates to "wages, hours and
working conditions" and was negotiated by the union for its own purposes, the pro-
vision being attacked is cloaked with antitrust immunity, and the suit should be dis-
missed. If the suit is dismissed, the disappointed player would then be relegated to
pursuing a remedy under the labor laws before the NLRB.
It is noteworthy, however, that Messrs. Jacobs and Winter have recently sug-
gested that matters which are the subject of collective bargaining should never be
open to antitrust challenge by disappointed members of the bargaining unit, because
such challenge "would effectively destroy collective bargaining by undermining the
authority of the bargaining representative. . . .47 This argument tends to overstate
the case since it assumes that many such challenges will succeed; there is no reason to
believe that collective bargaining provisions in professional athletics would be stricken
any more often than they are in other industries. The fear expressed by Jacobs and
Winter does, however, reflect that of Justice Goldberg in his concurring opinions in
43 8I U.S. at 665.
"Id. at 664-65. See also Riverton Coal Co. v. UMW, 453 F.2d 1035, 1041 (6th Cir. 1972).
"' As is indicated by Jewel Tea, these same rules should apply to a challenge brought by the owners.
See Jacobs & Winter, supra note 34, at 28.
"In Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the defendants did allege that the baseball
reserve clause was a mandatory subject of bargaining and, therefore, exempt from the antitrust laws.
id. at 805-o6. The court, however, was of the opinion that the reserve clause was not part of the
collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 8o6 n.5i. The Second Circuit found it unnecessary to pass on
the mandatory subject of bargaining issue, 443 F.2d at 268, as did the Supreme Court, 407 U.S. at 285.
It is to be noted that should such a determination become necessary, the Court said in Jewel Tea
that it would not be within the NLRB's exdusive primary jurisdiction. 381 US. at 684-88.
"1Jacobs & Winter, supra note 34, at 27. See also 1957 Hearings, pt. x, supra note 2, at 1252.
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Jewel Tea and Pennington that triers of fact will readily invalidate the provisions
in question on a more or less ad hoc basis.4s
The "subversion" concern is, as noted, a very real fear, but the solution is not to
spread the labor exemption beyond the bounds expressed in the Allen-Bradley, Jewel
Tea and Pennington cases by exempting all mandatory subjects of bargaining, as
proposed by Justice Goldberg, or to bar disappointed members of the bargaining
unit from complaining about the provisions negotiated by their bargaining agent,
as proposed by Jacobs and Winter. Rather, the solution is to work out these concerns
in such a way as to maintain the integrity of the Supreme Court's enunciated stan-
dards and yet to insure that the bargaining agents' authority will not be unduly
undermined. The proposed solution would be as follows: assuming that a dis-
appointed player, such as Curt Flood, should complain about a provision in the
collective bargaining agreement, such as the reserve clause, under an antitrust theory,
the provision would be invalidated only if it were found that the provision did not
relate to "wages, hours or working conditions" and that a conspiracy existed between
the bargaining agent and the owner-employers-the present standard of the Supreme
Court; to ensure the proper protection of the bargaining agents' authority, however,
a conspiracy could be found only when it were also shown that the bargaining agent
had violated its duty of fair representation 49-that is, if the bargaining agent properly
represented the interests of the majority of its members, it could not be found to have
participated in a conspiracy to benefit the owner-employers, and the terms of the
bargaining agreement could not, therefore, be invalidated by antitrust attack. This
is, in fact, a necessary predicate to the continued vitality of bargaining agent authority
for if its actions could be undercut by a single member of the bargaining unit
simply because a particular provision was antithetical to his, but not the majority of
the other members', interests, then the agent would be placed in an utterly untenable
position. If it represented the majority interest, as the duty of fair representation
compels it to do, then particular members could invalidate particular provisions un-
der the antitrust laws, and if it represented the particular interest of a minority of its
members, then. it could be the subject of fair representation attack by the majority.
Thus, the proposed solution would seem to accommodate both the scope of the
antitrust exemption and the agents' fair representation duty, since violation of the
former could be found only if there were also a violation of the latter. If an agent
were to bargain in consort with the employer-owners for the primary purpose of bene-
fiting the employer-owners in their product market, and not in its labor market, then
it might not be fairly representing the interests of the majority of its members and
could have no grounds upon which to object to having the provisions so negotiated
invalidated. 0 If, on the other hand, the bargaining agent reached an agreement with
4' See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
10 The duty of fair representation is discussed at some length at notes 143-51 infra and accompanying
text.
to It is true, of course, that a bargaining agent could negotiate a collective bargaining agreement
term in consort with an employer which primarily benefited the employer in its product market but
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the employer-owners in such a way as to fulfill its duty of fair representation, then
it should be able to successfully defend a minority attack upon the provisions ne-
gotiated by asserting the fact that it properly performed its statutory duty of fairly
representing its members. This solution is, moreover, no more than an expedient
means by which to accommodate the potentially conflicting provisions of the anti-
trust and labor laws, a process specifically adopted by the Supreme Court in
HutchesonY'
It must be noted, of course, that the proposed solution would apply only where
disappointed members of the bargaining unit seek to invalidate specific provisions
of a collective bargaining agreement, and would not foreclose antitrust attack in
other situations.5" Thus, there would be no reason to oppose legislation subjecting
professional sports to the antitrust laws,5" so long as a solution such as that proposed
were also adopted to protect the stature of bargaining unit representatives.
Should this proposed solution be adopted, a court should then approach an anti-
trust challenge to a term contained in a collective bargaining agreement by making
four preliminary factual determinations-(i) whether the term in question relates
to "wages, hours and working conditions," (2) whether it was arrived at through
bona fide collective bargaining in which (3) the players' representative was not acting
in consort with the owners, and in which (4) it fulfilled its duty of fair representa-
tion. If these questions are all answered in the affirmative, then the case should be
dismissed under Jewel Tea. If it is found that the second question is answered in
the affirmative but the third in the negative, then the court should determine whether
the union met its duty of fair representation. If that also is answered in the negative,
then relief should be granted; but if it is answered in the affirmative, then the case
should be dismissed, as indicated in the proposed solution. If it is concluded that
the second question must be answered in the negative-that is, that the owners im-
posed the term as a unilateral matter, and not as part of the collective bargaining
agreement 54 -then -the court should proceed to analyze it under the antitrust prin-
ciples involved, because if the term was not the product of bona fide collective
bargaining it should have no special antitrust immunity,5" and in that case the
which was not detrimental to the employees. The duty of fair representation as here used, however,
looks to the beneficial results of bargaining to the majority of employees, not simply the lack of detri-
ment. This view is consistent with the relevant inquiry of the labor antitrust exemption. Thus, in
Jewel Tea the Court was concerned with whether the terms in question were negotiated by the union
"in pursuit of their own labor union policies, and not at the behest of or in combination with nonlabor
groups." 38x U.S. at 69o.
312 U.S. at 231.
See Jacobs & Winter, supra note 34, at 27-28.
k See note 29 supra.
" This was the conclusion reached by Judge Cooper in the district court's preliminary opinion in
Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. at 8o6 n.5i.
"Thus, in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (972), Mr. Justice Marshall observed in his dissenting
opinion that
[t]here is surface appeal to respondents' argument that petitioner's sole remedy lies in filing a
claim with the National Labor Relations Board, but this argument is premised on the notion
that management and labor have agreed to accept the reserve clause. This notion is contradicted,
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bargaining agent's authority would not be undercut because it never had a voice
in the negotiation of the particular term. If a violation is then found, the term
would be stricken. It is to be kept in mind, however, that even if the term were
stricken, the parties would still be free to include it in a future collective bargaining
agreement, because it would then be exempt from antitrust attack by a disappointed
bargaining unit member, as indicated in the analysis hereinbefore presented5 6
This lengthy discussion of the antitrust principles involved in player suits to in-
validate collective bargaining agreement terms was necessitated by the ambiguity
in this area of the law as a general matter, and because if bona fide collective bar-
gaining is initiated in the professional team sport industry there will surely be many
changes in the existing structure of owner-player and superstar-journeyman relations
which will give rise to antitrust litigation by disappointed parties. This discussion
is of value, in this regard, because it is believed that it sets forth an easily applied
framework to analyze such player or owner challenges, while preserving the essential
policies of both the labor and antitrust laws.
III
THE APPROpRIATE BARGAINING UNIT
Having concluded that the NLRA covers the professional team sport industry,
and that there is a harmonious means available to resolve the antitrust aspects of player
challenges of particular contract provisions, consideration should now be given to
other problems that are likely to arise as the owners and players embark upon their
sojourn down the collective bargaining trail.
The initial step in any analysis of a group of employees and the NLRA is to
determine what will be the appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining.3
This is important because it will establish the scope of controversies that particular
bargaining representatives may pursue with particular employers. Over the years,
the Board has worked out a fairly clear scheme of rules for the making of this de-
termination. Without involving NLRB procedures, the parties may agree amongst
themselves as to what the appropriate unit shall be, but if they fail to do so, the
NLRB will itself make the determination.5" In making that determination, the
Board will use a number of tests which include (I) the extent and type of union
organization of the employees; (2) the bargaining history in the industry; (3) the
in part, by the record in this case. Petitioner suggests that the reserve system was thrust upon
the players by the owners . . . If this is true, the question arises as to whether there would
be any exemption from the antitrust laws in this case.
407 U.S. at 295.
" See X957 Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 2, at 2655-57. Thus, it has been observed that "what is an illegal
and unreasonable restraint of trade [in violation of the antitrust laws] very well may not be an unfair
labor practice." Id. at 2657. But cf. the opinion of Edward Garvey, Executive Director of the National
Football Players Association, in Brown, Because of a Clause, a Clause, SPoRTs ILLUSTRATED, May 1, 1972,
at 67.
5 National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
" td. § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § z69(b) (1970).
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similarity in the duties, skills, interests and working conditions of the employees;
(4) the organizational structure of the company; and (5) the desires of the em-
ployees. 9
In the professional team sports, the appropriate unit could be the team; the
league; the sport, with or without the minor leagues thereof; or the entirety of the
industry without regard to the different sports. Any or all of these unit sizes are
feasible, and it seems clear that the Board's determining tests would facilitate any of
them, inasmuch as there is virtually no bargaining history in any of the sports, the
necessary skills are essentially identical, the organizational structure of all employers
is similar, and the players might desire any such size. The appropriate unit, thire-
fore, would seem to depend upon the extent and type of union organization in the
industry. Although the natural unit would seem to be the team,"0 since the players
on any one team are employed by its owner and not by the league or sport itself,
it seems clear that the preferential size of the bargaining unit in this industry is
the sport, except where there are two separate leagues within the same sport. Thus,
the present unit in football and baseball is the entire sport,6 ' while in basketball it is
the league,62 there having been as yet no merger in that sport."
A. Multi-Employer Bargaining and "Constructive Merger"
The present size of the bargaining unit in each sport, however, is relatively un-
important, inasmuch as one may safely take as given the present scope of the various
units in the industry. What is important are some of the other rules that govern
bargaining unit determinations as a general matter. The first is that the inclusive-
ness of the bargaining unit is an issue that is a proper subject for discussion at the
bargaining table, and when raised;it is a permissive subject of bargaining-that is,
it is one which does not require the other party to bargain and which does not allow
the proposing party to resort to economic sanctions for its obtainment.- Once a bar-
-8 These factors are individually discussed in Momus, supra note 41, at 217-22.
GoSee Brown, Owners Can Be Tackled Too, SpORTS ILLusTRATED, Mar. 22, 1971, at 21.
61CoxmEarvE BARGmiAmN AGREEmENT op THE NATIoNAL FOOTRALL LEAcuE 5; (X97o) [hereinafter
cited as NFL AGREEMENT]. See also Labor Relations in Professional sports, supra note 2, at 9r.
02Hearngs Before the Senate Subcomm. on Antitrtust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the
Judidary, 92d Cong., ist Sess., pts. I & 2, at pt. 1, 194 (1971) [hereinafter. cited as Professional Basketball
Merger]; Labor Relations in Professional Sports, supra note 2, at 65.
0Legislation to facilitate the merger is, of course, now before Congress. S. 2373, 92d Cong., ist Sess.
(1971). But cf. S. 26x6, 92d Cong., ist Sess. (1971), introduced by Senator Ervin to specifically apply
the antitrust laws to professional sports in full force. Senator Ervin's views are recorded in 117 CoNG.
Rsc. 15451 (197x). The merger question is considered in some detail in two volumes of hearings. See
Professional Basketball Merger, pts. i & 2, supra note 62.
0' See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1958). Thus, in Douds
v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 24r F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1957), where the union resorted to a
strike when bargaining reached impasse over its demand for a broad extension of the bargaining unit,
the court held it in violation of its duty to bargain pursuant to section 8(b)(3). It said that "[s]uch a
demand interferes with the required bargaining 'with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours and conditions
of employment in a manner excluded by the Act." Id. at 283. See also AFL-CIO Joint Bargaining Com.
mittee, 184 N.L.R.B. No. io6 (1970); Steere Broadcasting Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 487, 507 (1966).
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gaining unit determination has been made, therefore, either by the Board or the
parties themselves, it may be altered by the Board or by the parties' mutual agree-
ment, so long as that agreement does not disrupt the bargaining process. 5 Thus,
although bargaining unit determinations seem already to have been made in the
team sport industry, that fact would not preclude the parties from adjusting the size
of the unit to meet their own convenience.
The second group of rules that is important are those that have grown up to
govern the phenomenon known as multi-employer bargaining. This refers, simply,
to the quite common practice of several employers in one industry bargaining with
a single union. These rules are important because the unit that has been seen to be
the chosen size in the team sport industry is the sport-wide unit, which is, of course,
a multi-employer bargaining unit, as is even the league-wide unit in basketball. In
light of the fact that multi-employer bargaining is common in other parts of the
entertainment industry,6" it hardly seems surprising that it should also be found
in professional sports.
The history of multi-employer bargaining long antedates the Wagner Act,67 and
was, at least in its origins, designed as a technique of countervailing power whereby
small employers could join together to match the bargaining strength of the union
which represented its employees6-- that is, the multi-employer group would become
the bargaining agent for the group.69 The rules which have grown up to govern
this bargaining technique all revolve around the central principle that the wider
bargaining unit is entirely a consensual matter 6 Thus, in determining the appro-
priateness of such a unit, as opposed to the presumptively appropriate single employer
unit,71 the Board requires a controlling history of collective bargaining on a multi-
employer basis,72 or a joint agreement between the employers and the union that a
multi-employer unit is appropriate 3 Similarly, the settled criterion for determining
the inclusion of any particular employer within that unit is whether it unequivocally
intends to be bound in collective bargaining by the group, rather than pursuing his
own individual bargaining.74 Thus, delegation of authority to a common bargaining'
O5 See Lever Bros. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 448 (1951).
0 See, e.g., Cavendish Record Mfg. Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 1I61 (1959) (musicians); National Broad-
casting Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 587 (1953) (free lance writers); American Broadcasting Co., 96 N.L.R.B.
815 (1951) (actors); Television Film Producers Ass'n, 93 N.L.R.B. 929 (1951) (actors).
67 NLRB v. Truck Drivers, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957).
06 See generally Morius, supra note 41, at 237.
60 See NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357 (1969). It is worth noting, however, that the group agreement
is not cast in stone. Thu, individual negotiations at the local level will not cause dissolution, or with-
drawal from, the multi-employer unit. See The Kroger Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 569, 573 (1964). Similarly,
retention by the employers of the right to approve or disapprove the agreement negotiated will not
invalidate the wider unit. See Quality Limestone Products Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 587, 591 (1963).
70 See Retail Associates, Inc., 12o N.L.R.B. 388, 393 (1958).
7LSee Cab Operating Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 878, 879 (1965); John Breuner Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 394
(196o); Weaver Motors, 123 N.L.R.B. 209, 212-13 (959)-
'2 York Transfer & Storage Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 139, 142 (953).
"See Western Ass'n of Engineers, ioz N.L.R.B. 64 (1952); see also Calumet Contractors Ass'n,
121 N.L.R.B. 8o, 81 n.i (x958).
"See Electric Theatre, 156 N.L.R.B. 1351 (1966).
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agent will signify the requisite intent,75 although mere adoption of a contract already
negotiated will not render the adopting firm a member of the multi-employer
group.70 The corollary to these consensual inclusion rules is that any employer,
regardless of previous bargaining policy or practice, may withdraw from the wider
unit at any time,77 but to be effective it must be shown to have manifested an un-
equivocal and timely intention to withdraw therefrom on a permanent basis.
7s1
When an employer so withdraws his motive for doing so is immaterial.P These
same withdrawal rules also apply to the union members of the unitY0
The multi-employer rules indicate, therefore, that owners and players may with-
draw from the present unit whenever it is determined that they could negotiate more
advantageously in individual bargaining. Although as a practical matter such action
seems unlikely, it is significant to note that the authority for it does exist and could
be used as a viable bargaining tool by either side.
Considered together, these two rules indicate that the scope of the bargaining
unit is a matter that is subject to the consensual agreement of the owners and
players. Although it may seem difficult to determine why this fact is itself important,
that is not because of its lack of importance, but is, rather, because of the difficulty in
foreseeing the future events which would make it important. The best current
example of its importance, perhaps, is the current merger dispute involving the
American and National Basketball Associations.81 If Congress should not grant
the merger, the leagues could, at least in theory, get the results of formal merger by
utilization of the multi-employer bargaining unit device, without the necessity of
going to Congress, hat in hand, for a formal antitrust waiver. The results of formal
merger could be obtained because the fruits sought to be gained thereby are all equally
available from collective bargaining discussion. Thus, the goals of merger are the
establishment of a common draft, and end to the "raiding" of players and other rel-
atively anti-competitive, from the players' point of view, policies.8 2 Though these
7r When members of an association jointly bargain, their bylaws should specify that collective bar-
gaining agreements negotiated by the association bind all members, see Governale & Drew, Inc., io6
N.L.R.B. 1316, X319-20 (1953), because if loose group action is followed, the Board may find the absence
of the requisite intent. See, e.g., Electric Theatre, 156 N.L.R.B. 135i (1966).
76National Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 131 N.L.R.B. 550, 551-52 (,96z); see also Jewish Bakery
Ass'n, ioo N.L.R.B.- 1245, 1246 (952).
77 See Johnson Optical Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 539 (i949).
'8 See B. Brody Seating Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 830 (1967). This is generally accomplished by notice, and
the proper notice rule requires that written notice of the intention to withdraw be given before the con-
tractually set date for modification. Retail Associates, Inc., 12o N.L.R.B. 388 (i958); but c/. Imperial
Outdoor Advertising, 192 N.L.R.B. No. X83 (i971) (oral notice sufficient). If not so given, the notice
is not timely. Thus, in NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357 (1969), the Supreme Court refused to allow
withdrawal where the employer gave notice after the negotiated agreement became effective.
" See Evening News Ass'n, 154 N.L.R.B. 1494, 1495 (r965); Bearing Rim & Supply Co., 107 N.L.R.B.
101, 103 (1953)-
so See Evening News Ass'n, X54 N.L.R.B. 1494, 1495 (965).
81 See S.2373, 9 2d Cong., ist Sess. (I97I) (in favor of merger); S.26x6, 9 2d Cong., ist Sess. (1971)
(opposed to the merger); Labor Relations in Professional Sports, supra note 2, at 67; 117 CoNo. Rec.
15451 (1971) (remarks of Senator Sam J. Ervin). See generally Professional Basketball Merger, pts. I & 2,
supra note 62.
11 See Professional Basketball Merger, pt. 2, supra note 62, at 856.
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factors may seem to raise a serious antitrust specter-the reason, of course, for the
congressional merger consent-they are all factors that could validly become parts
of a collective bargaining agreement, and be thereby lodged in a harbor safe from
antitrust challenge by either owners or players.
Given the multi-employer rules already considered, the owners and players in
the two leagues simply would need to agree to bargain on a joint basis. By so doing,
the owners would be agreeing to bargain via the multi-employer device, while the
players associations would, by agreeing to bargain as one, simply be presenting them-
selves in a coalition bargaining posture83 So long as all parties agreed to the
procedure, their action would be perfectly permissible as a matter of labor law-
which is no more than to state the familiar shibboleth that the right of both em-
ployees and employers "to choose whomever they wish to represent them in formal
labor negotiations is fundamental to the statutory scheme."84 The provisions agreed
upon should be immune from antitrust attack, moreover, so long as the terms negoti-
ated relate to wages, hours or working conditions, and were the result of bona fide
collective bargaining, where the union met its duty of fair representation and did
not conspire with the employers! 5
The difficulty with such a procedure, of course, is that multi-employer bargaining
requires consent, and, at least to date, the players in the NBA have been adamantly
opposed to the merger86 Thus, it is unlikely, that they would agree to the joint
bargaining, which would, after all, have the same practical effect. This intransigence
could, however, be overcome if the owners were to agree to a particular demand of
the players-such as abolition of the option clause in favor of a less restrictive al-
ternative-in return for the joint bargaining, though this would itself pose a hazard
to the owners, inasmuch as the players could opt out of the unit after getting the
favored term. Withdrawal might itself be precluded by making any such ac-
quiescence conditional upon maintenance of the multi-employer unit, upon other
terms agreed upon as the quid pro quo for the multi-employer unit-such as the
common player draft-or the owners could simply negotiate a long-term contract.
It would, therefore, appear that these bargaining unit rules could be used to
obtain a "constructive merger," though there would, of course, be many difficulties
if such a course of action were to be undertaken. Although this is not the place
to finally resolve those difficulties, such potential use of the bargaining unit rules
85 Coalition bargaining refers, simply, to the presentment of a common front by several unions to a
single employer, just the converse of multi-employer bargaining. Recent cases have left no question that
in the absence of a clearly improper motivation, coalition bargaining is as permissible as is its multi-
employer counterpart. See General Electric Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 253 (1968), afl'd, 412 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.
1969); American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 155 N.L.R.B. 736 (1965); Standard Oil Corp., 137
N.L.R.B. 69o (1962), enforced, 322 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1963).
4 General Electric Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 3969).
"
5 See notes 27-55 supra and accompanying text.
-8 See Labor Relations in Professional Sports, supra note 2, at 65-72; Professional Basketball Merger,
pt. 2, supra note 62, at 227, 303. The players in the ABA, however, seem generally to be in favor of
the merger legislation. Id. at 138, 144; but cf. id. at 140.
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nicely illustrates the type of issue that can find its way into the sports picture once
the owners and players have entered the collective bargaining arena.
B. Inclusion of the Commissioner in the Bargaining Unit
In considering the appropriate scope of the bargaining unit in professional sports,
it is also necessary to consider the attempt of at least one players association to in-
dude their league commissioner within the bargaining unit as an employer8 The
purpose behind such inclusion would be to make the disciplinary powers of the com-
missioner a subject of collective bargaining, as opposed to the present "self-govern-
ment" system over which the players associations have very little control. This
self-government system came into existence originally to preserve the integrity of
baseball in the wake of the Black Sox scandal in i919,ss and has since spread to the
other professional team sportsY9 It gives the commissioner the power to maintain
order and discipline in all aspects of his particular sport by acting as final arbiter
of any disputes that may ariseP°--he has, thus, both investigative and judicial power.Y'
To determine whether a players association could succeed in an effort to include
the commissioner in the bargaining unit, attention might be focused on a question
that has frequently arisen in industrial labor relations-whether an employers' asso-
" See Labor Relations in Professional Sports, supra note 2, at 76, 92, where it is indicated that this
attempt was made by the NFL Players Association in x968.
8 See generally E. ASINOF, EIGHT MEN OuT: ThE BLACK Sox SCANDAL AND THE 1919 WoRLD
SasuEs (1963).
89 See Labor Relations in Professional Sports, supra note 2, at 25, 76, 92.
20 The Standard Player Contract in the NFL provides, for example, that
All matters in dispute between the Player and the Club shall be referred to the Commissioner
and his decision shall be accepted as final [and the player] .. . hereby releases and discharges the
Commissioner . . . from any and all claims . . . arising out of . . . any decision of the Com-
missioner.
NATIONAL FooTBA. LEAGuE STANDARD PLAYER CoNrE CT § 4; see also AmEANm BAsxmrTaBA ASSOCwAnON
UNiFoa% PLAYER CoNTRAcr § 13 (though in the ABA the Commissioner may designate another to act as
arbitrator); Krasnow & Levy, supra note I, at 755. With regard to the above NFL provision, it is worth
noting that any clause which purports to bar players from "going into the courts to have redress" for
what they perceive to be a commissioner's wrongful action has been said to be "void as against public
policy," and should, therefore, be deleted from future player contracts. z957 Hearings, pt. 2, supra
note 2, at 2589, 2645, 2653. This warning seems to have been taken to heart by the National Basketball
Association, inasmuch as in that league the commissioner is only the first step in the arbitration process,
and then acts only as a mediator. If that process is unsuccessful, the parties may then take the dispute
to court. NATIONAL BAsxnTBALL ASSOCIATION UNIFORM PLAYER CONTRACT § 21.
"See H.R. RE'. No. 2oo2, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1952); Labor Relations in Professional Sports,
supra note 2, at X5; 1957 Hearings, pt. 3, supra note 2, at 2720-32.
There are, thus, two systems of self-government in the professional team sport industry-that is,
the collective bargaining system and the commissioners' system-both of which are concerned with the
terms and conditions of employment. To solve this particular problem, the players association and owners
in the National Football League, in 1968 and 1970, made the constitution, bylaws and standard player
contract of the league, which gave the commissioner his power, subject to the provisions of the col-
lective bargaining agreement in the event of conflict between the former and the latter, NFL AGRE EMNT
art. II, § 2, art. II, § I, with the commissioner to be final arbitrator of disputes which therein between
arose, NFL AGREEMENr art. X; NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGuE STANDARD PLAYER CoNTrAcr § 4, except
that in the 1970 agreement it was provided that the final arbitrator in an in;ury grievance would be
chosen by the commissioner from a list approved by the parties. NFL AoaMEN'T art. XI; NATIONAL
FOOTBALL LEAGUE STANDARD PLAYER CoNTRAcT § X4.
COLLEcrIVE BARGAINING
ciation is an "employer" within the meaning of section 2(2), and thus an appropriate
member of the bargaining unit; though it must be noted that the inclusiveness of
the term "employer" has generally arisen in the context of unfair labor practice
charges, rather than in unit determination disputes so that their authority may be
somewhat limited. The term "employer" is defined in section 2(2) to include "any
person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly. '9 2 Thus, where
the employers' association negotiates collective bargaining contracts on the member
employers' behalf, it is their agent and, therefore, an employer itself.93 Where the
agency relationship is less clear, however, a contrary result is reached. In Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios,94 for example, the Board found that a motion picture pro-
ducers' association was not an "employer" where, although it negotiated on behalf of
some employers, there was no evidence to indicate that it was authorized to control
labor policies or to handle the employment problems of its members. 5 Although the
MGM case was decided prior to the Taft-Hartley amendments which added the
specific agency language to section 2(2)," 6 it is a clear indication that to come within
the "employer" term the association must be participating in the collective bargaining
process on behalf of the employers, and that the extent and character of the asso-
ciation's participation must be clear to all parties.
97
The commissioner could be included, therefore, only if it were found that he
participated in the collective bargaining process on behalf of the owners. It is im-
portant to note that the commissioner is subject to the direct control of the owners,
but not the players, since it is the owners who control his appointment, salary, and
tenure9 Generally the commissioner has the power to veto specific contracts that
are negotiatedV9 In addition, it has been reported that the commissioner of baseball
02 National Labor Relations Act § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970). The determination of when
an agency relation is present is covered by id. § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(13) (1970).
"3See, e.g., NLRB v. E. F. Shuck Constr. CO., 243 F.2d 519 (9 th Cir. 1957); Employing Plasterer's
Ass'n of Chicago v. Operational Plasterers & Cement Masons Int'l Ass'n of U.S. & Canada, 172 F. Supp.
337 (ND. Ill. 1959); Jan Power, Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 798 (1968); Teamsters Local No. 386, x45
N.L.R.B. X475 (x964); Utah Plumbing & Heating Contractors Ass'n, 125 N.L.R.B. 256 (959); Broward
County Launderers & Cleaners Ass'n, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 379 (963); Williams Coal Co., ii N.L.R.B. 579
(1930).
947 N.L.R.B. 662 (938).
0" Id. at 695.
00 The original NLRA had provided that a person was an "employer" if he acted "in the interest of an
employer," Act of July 5, 1935, Ch. 372, § 2(2), 49 Stat. 450, whereas the present language uses the
express agency language. National Labor Relations Act § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (970).
"07 7 N.L.R.B. at 695. See also NLRB v. B. F. Shuck Constr. Co., 243 F.2d 519, 521 (9th Cir. 1957);
Strickeler Motors, 87 N.L.R.B. 1313 (1949).
""See American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, iSo N.L.R.B. I89 (x969); Krasnow & Levy,
supra note X, at 755; Labor Relations in Professional Sports, supra note 2, at 15. It has, thus, been
said that "the commissioner isn't going to bite the hand that feeds him, and the owners make him."
z957 Hearings, pt. I, supra note 2, at x216. In spite of these facts, however, Bert Bell, one-time com-
missioner of the NFL, once said that he owed greater allegiance to the players than he did to the
owners. See id., pt. 3, at 2503; Cf. id. at 2633 (players rebuttal).
9 See, e.g., AmExRiCAN BASKETBALL Assocu-noN UNIFORM Pr.A CoNRAncr § 9; NATIONAL BAsKET-
BALL AssoCIATiON UNIFORM PLAYER CoNTRscr § 14; NATIONAL FooTAL. LEAGUE STANDARD PLAYER CON-
TRAcT § 17.
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took an active part in settling the baseball strike in the spring of 1972100 and that to
avert a similar occurrence the owners have given him added powers in the collective
bargaining process.'0
In this light, it would seem that the commissioner could be included since it
appears that at least in some sports he participates in the collective bargaining
process.Y2 This result is of little real significance, however, inasmuch as the com-
missioner's disciplinary powers would be subject to collective bargaining whether or
not he were actually to be included in the bargaining unit. Disciplinary powers are
clearly within the concept of the terms and conditions of employment and would,
therefore, be mandatory subjects of bargaining about which the owners must
negotiate. Thus, the players could demand that they be given full procedural due
process rights in all disciplinary matters,"0 3 and this would be a subject about which
100 Thus, it was reported that Commissioner Kuhn was, in fact, "getting into the thick of things."
Washington Post, Apr. 5, 1972, S D, at a, col. 2. It was also suggested that he might resolve the strike
dispute. Washington Post, Apr. 6, 1972, § G, at 2, col. 5.10
' See Indianapolis Star, July 8, 1972, at 25, col. I.
102In this regard, it is worth noting that in American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, ±8o
N.L.R.B. z89 (x969), the Board used language which does, in fact, indicate its finding of a relationship
between the commissioner and owners in the American League of Baseball which approaches that of an
agency, though the question then before it was whether the Board should decline jurisdiction over baseball
because of the commissioner self-government system. This system, the Board said, would not induce it
to decline jurisdiction because
ithe system appears to have been designed almost entirely by employers and owners, and the final
arbiter of internal disputes does not appear to be a neutral third party freely chosen by both sides,
but rather an individual appointed solely by the member club owners themselves. We do not be-
lieve that such a system is likely either to prevent labor disputes from arising in the future,
or, having once arisen, to resolve them in a manner susceptible or conducive to voluntary com-
pliance by all parties involved. Moreover, it is patently contrary to the letter and spirit of the Act
for the Board to defer its undoubted jurisdiction to decide unfair labor practices to a disputes
settlement system established unilaterally by an employer or group of employers.
Id. at x91 (emphasis added). The relevance of this language in the present context is that the Board
wholly, disavowed any intent to allow a governance system to exist outside the confines of the NLRA, and
its own jurisdiction, even though such lack of deference may tend to disrupt the self-governance system.
See 35th ANNuAT. REPORT oF m NATsoNAL LABOR, RELA-ONS BoARD 22, 26 (1970). Thus, in response
to the assertion that Board processes could be used to deprive the commissioner of disciplinary powers,
the Board said that "Board processes only prohibit discipline based upon Section 7 considerations." x8o
N.L.R.B. at 191 n.14. The fact that such processes would interfere with the self-government system was,
therefore, irrelevant.
It is also worthy of note that a proposal has recently been made to establish a federal agency to
supervise the grievance machinery in the professional team sport industry. See Comment, Discipline in
Professional Sports: The Need for Player Protection, 6o Gao. L.J. 77x (1972) (this article also contains
an excellent review of the disciplinary system's operation, and a constitutional basis upon which to
challenge alleged abuses of power therein). In opposing a bill exempting the proposed merger of the
American and National Basketball Associations, Senator Ervin threatened that if the bill were to pass
be would introduce legislation to create such an agency. 117 Co No. REC. 1545± (197±). It is the
opinion of this writer, however, that no such agency system is necessary, since the disciplinary system
may be adequately handled within the framework of the collective bargaining process. Thus, in a Report
on Organized Baseball, a House committee once observed that it "would be unwise in the extreme to
saddle professional baseball with a new governmental bureau to control its destiny." H.R. Rap. No.
2002, 82d Cong., 2d Ses. 23± (±952). See also 1957 Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 2, at 2657, 267±.
"" Procedural due process rights have been grudgingly finding their way into the labor law. The
most recent controversy has been over when an employee has the right to be represented by counsel in
employer confrontations. The rule that the Board and the courts first adopted was that representation
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the owners would be required to bargain in good faith. Inclusion of the commis-
sioner may be seen, then, to be somewhat of an academic question; although it does
demonstrate, again, the ambiguity now present in the sports industry due to the
advent of collective bargaining and its adherent labor law principles.
C. A Separate Superstar Bargaining Unit
Inasmuch as circumstances may arise wherein the superstars of a particular league
would like to establish themselves as a separate bargaining unit, it is necessary that
attention be given to the question of whether the superstars may constitute a bar-
gaining unit apart from that which represents the mass of players.10 4 The basis of
such a decision would be that superstars are a group identifiably different from
the average players, and require, therefore, a separate bargaining representative to ad-
equately protect their best interests. Since there could not be two separate repre-
sentatives in the same unit, the stars would have to be able to establish a separate
bargaining unit in order to have their own representative.
As a matter of labor law, the permissibility of the superstar unit may be con-
sidered from either of two vantage points. First, as has already been seen,"0 5 bar-
gaining in the team sport industry is on a multi-employer basis, so that a superstar
unit could be said to constitute an attempt to effect a partial withdrawal from the
multi-employer unit. Partial withdrawal questions have usually arisen when an
employer, rather than a portion of its employees, seeks to withdraw from the multi-
employer unit to pursue individual bargaining with a union; it has generally been
allowed when timely notice has been given.'0 The attempt by a union to sever a
class of employees from all employers, however, raises a far different question, in-
volving as it does an attempt to fragmentize the bargaining unit. In such cases, the
Board has consistently followed the rule that a union's petition to separately represent
a sub-group of employees will be denied in the multi-employer context if it seeks
would be allowed in disciplinary but not investigatory interviews. See Texaco, Inc., x68 N.L.R.B. 361
(x968), enforcement denied, 408 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1969); see also Texaco, Inc., Los Angeles Sales
Terminal, 179 N.L.R.B. 976 (1969); Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 84 (1968). Realizing
that this distinction was more metaphysical than real, the Board recently adopted a rule which states that
an employee is entitled to representation where "the interview, whether or not purely investigative, con-
cerns a subject matter related to disciplinary offenses." Quality Mfg. Co., i95 N.L.R.B. No. 42 (1972).
It seems clear, in any event, that employees are entitled to representation in disciplinary interviews. This
tends to make somewhat of a shambles of owners' comments that a player's attorney should always be
barred because of the fact that the owners take care of the players, 1957 Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 2, at
1253, and that they, the attorneys, are "rabblerousers" and "flannelmouths." Id., Pt. 3, at 2877.
"" This desire might, for example, arise if the majority of the members of the bargaining unit-
that is, the "average" ballplayers-should decide to require their bargaining agent to negotiate terms
which would favor their interests to the detriment of the superstars. Such a situation might, again for
example, occur when the agent is directed to negotiate for a schedular salary structure, as opposed to
the present minimum salary term. See notes [52-58 infra and accompanying text.
0 See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
o See, e.g., Walker Electric Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 12i4 (1963); Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bar-
tenders Union, Local 327, 131 N.L.R.B. x98 (s96r); York Transfer & Storage Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 139
(1953). See generally Moams, supra note 41, at 243-45.
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severance of fewer than all employers in the unit. 0 7 Where, however, the severance
sought is coextensive with the existing bargaining unit, the petition will be allowed,
so long as the requirements of an ordinary severance procedure are satisfiedYV8
The second viewpoint from which this question may be considered is that of the
severance rules themselves. Severance is a common phenomenon in industrial labor
relations, and when it takes place the extent to which employees have organized in
the past may not be given controlling weight in determining whether a new group is
appropriate 09 -though bargaining history is important11 ° Severance questions have
arisen primarily in the area of craft severance from larger industrial unions, and al-
though the NLRB has followed a somewhat erratic path in the past,"11 it recently
stated the standards that it would follow in making craft severance decisions. In
Mallinckrodt Chemical Works,"12 the Board said that it would consider the following
factors in craft severance cases: (i) whether a tradition of separate representation
exists; (2) the history of collective bargaining of the employees and plant involved;
(3) whether the employees have established and maintained their separate identity;
(4) the history and pattern of collective bargaining in the industry involved; (5)
the degree of integration in the employers' production process; and (6) the qualifica-
tions of the union seeking to "carve-out" a separate unit." 3 In spite of this array
of factors, it has been reported that the Board will be quite reluctant to permit
severance, basically because by so doing it will be "sowing the seeds of labor relations
instability" by undermining the bargaining position of the majority employee
group.1 14
Applying the Mallinckrodt criteria in the present context does not portend a prom-
ising result -for the superstars. There has not been a tradition of separate representa-
tion-individual salary negotiations do not constitute separate representation-there
"'7See A. B. Hirschfield Press, Inc., 14o N.L.R.B. 212 (r962); Grand Rapids General Motors, 131
NL.R.B. 439, 440 (1961); see also Jahn-Tyler Printing & Publishing Co., I12 N.L.R.B. 167 (955);
United Can & Glass Co., xo5 N.L.R.B. 69, 71 (1953).1 0 Friden Calculating Machine Co., xio N.L.R.B. i6x8, x6x9-2o (1954) (severance allowed from
a 2 employer bargaining unit); see also Printing Industry of Delaware, 131 N.L.R.B. 1oo (1961).
'National Labor Relations Act § 9(c) (5), 29 U.S.C. § .59(c) (5) (1970).
'
10 See International Ass'n of Tool Craftsmen v. Leedom, 276 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 815 (x96o).
... At an early date, the Board had taken the stand that no craft severance would be allowed so long
as the industrial union had had a successful history of bargaining for the craft unit and had adequately
represented the craft's interest. American Can Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 1252 (1939). This stance was softened
slightly in General Electric Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 57 0944), but it was the Taft-Hartley amendments that
turned the tide. Taft-Hartley added section 9 (b)(2), which provides that a prior Board determination
shall not preclude the establishment of a craft unit. National Labor Relations Act § 9(b)(2), 29 U.S.C.
§ I5 9 (b)(2) (1970). The Board, however, still limited severance, and in National Tube Co., 76
N.L.R.B. 1199 (1948), it held that severance would be denied where the industry in question was high.
ly integrated. The Board then decided that, in essence, a craft could seek severance whenever it chose.
American Potash & Chemical Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 148 (954). Finally, the Board adopted its present
position in Mallinckrodt.
112 162 N.L.R.B. 387 (1966). See also E. I. duPont deNemours & Co., x6z N.LR.B. 413 (1966);
Holmberg, Inc., z62 N.L.R.B. 407 (1966).
218 162 N.L.R.B. at 397.-
"" See J. ABODEELY, THE ApitoPaRIATE BARGAINING UNr IIi (X971).
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is an established history of league-wide bargaining, and the superstars have not main-
tained a separate identity." 5 Indeed, the superstars are in a position similar to that
of the instrument mechanics in Mallinckrodt, who were denied separate unit status
because they were an integral part of the production process, did not constitute
an identifiable group since their separate interests had been submerged in the broader
community, had been adequately represented by the industrial union, and "the
interests served by maintenance of stability in the existing bargaining unit... out-
weigh[ed] the interests of affording... [a few employees] the opportunity to change
their mode of representation.""' 6
Even if the stars were to prevail on one of these two theories, an exacerbatingly
difficult factual determination would have to be made-that is, what would be the
basis of distinguishing a "superstar" from a "non-superstar"? Such a distinction
could be made on the basis of years in the professional league, salary or on some
other basis such as batting average, average point production, earned run average,
pass completion percentage or any other statistical measure, all of which would suffer
from the demonstrable difference that exists between different positions within a
given sport and between the same positions over a period of time. Even if a jurisdic-
tional boundary could be reached, there would remain the problem of a constantly
fluctuating membership; from year-to-year some players would not meet the sta-
tistical measure because of having had a bad year, sickness, or some other factor.
In light of the present league-wide bargaining, the factual difficulty that would be
involved in having a separate superstar unit, and the Board's reluctance to allow
partial withdrawal or grant severance petitions, it seems unlikely that the superstars
could establish their own bargaining unit. Superstars must, therefore, expect that
they will have to seek satisfaction of their interests and grievances within the larger
bargaining community.
IV
TBE ImpAcT OF CoLEEcTrv BARGAINING ON PARTICULAR
AGREEmENT PRovisioNs
Although the core of this analysis is the simple proposition that the owners and
players in the organized professional sports are now subject to the vicissitudes of
the national labor policy, as is graphically illustrated by the foregoing discussion of
the bargaining unit, attention must also be given to the effect of that determination
upon some of the particular provisions that will be contained in future collective
bargaining agreements. In light of the increasingly recognized economic power of
%is There is, however, room for the contention that superstars in at least one sport have in fact
maintained their separate identity and that the league-wide bargaining was based only upon a special
agreement. It has, thus, been reported that when the National Football League Players Association
was formed, the superstars conditioned their joining upon an agreement that the Association would bar-
gain only for a minimum salary term, leaving them free to use their greater bargaining power for their
own benefit. See Labor Relations in Professional Sports, supra note 2, at 91. In light of this agreement,
one seeking to splinter a superstar unit in the NFL could well have a basis for arguing a compliance
with at least one of the Mallincrodt standards.
lie x62 N.LR.B. at 399-
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the players and their opinion that their contracts are "legal monstrosities,"' 17 it seems
clear that the terms and conditions of their employment will be a subject of not
inconsiderable controversy in future bargaining sessions.
The breadth of subject matter available for consideration at this juncture spans
the entire field of labor-management relations in professional sports." 8 Inasmuch as
the thrust of this inquiry is to simply illustrate the impact of the labor laws on pro-
fessional sports, attention will be limited to what is perceived to be the two most im-
portant aspects of current negotiations-the minimum terms and conditions of em-
ployment provisions and the various means of allocating players and restricting their
mobility.
Before considering these two types of provisions, it is worth noting that the
chief difficulty in analyzing terms or clauses in present or future collective bargaining
agreements in the professional team sport area is that such provisions generally have
no counterpart in the industrial labor relations contexts heretofore dealt with by the
NLRB and the courts. When a clause in a sports agreement is considered, there-
fore, resort must be made by rough analogy to situations that have arisen in in-
dustrial labor relations, and the rules that have been fashioned there around, in order
to have some understanding of its permissibility." 9 It is by this process that the two
1 7 See z957 Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 2, at 2644. See also z964 Hearings, supra note 5, at io8; but
cf. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 292 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
11"An example of the type of controversy which might arise is the recent disagreement bctween the
NFL Players Association and the team owners over the installation of artificial turf on football fields.
The Players Association demanded bargaining over the turf issue, but the owners denied they had an
obligation to bargain during the term of the current collective bargaining agreement. The NLRB held
that the future installation of artificial turf on football fields was a mandatory subject of bargaining
because the form of the playing field and its effect on the health of players was a condition of employ-
ment. National Football League Management Council, 203 N.L.R.B. No. 165 (May 30, 1973), 1973
CCH NLRB Dec. 25,406.
... Perhaps the best way to illustrate this is to simply take a non-random example of a problem
that could arise in future professional sports collective bargaining. Concern has been expressed by
players over the transfer of a particular team franchise from one city to another. See Labor Relations
in Professional Sports, supra note 2, at 71. Franchise movement is, of course, roughly analogous to the
"runaway shop" phenomenon in the industrial labor area. To illustrate the difficulty involved in com-
paring sports problems to industrial labor problems, the law relating to runaway shops will be considered
and then applied to the sports phenomenom of the moved franchise.
In analyzing runaway shop problems, a distinction has been drawn between a threatened and an
actual move. See, e.g., Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 US. 263, 269-75 (1965). For
present purposes, let us assume that an actual move is about to be made, and that there has been no
threat thereof to get concessions at the bargaining table. Thus, attention will be directed only at the
rules which have evolved when the change is actually accomplished.
As a general proposition, it may be stated that a plant dislocation will be an unfair labor practice
under section 8(a)(3) if motivated by a desire to hinder or prevent union activity. Darlington Mfg.
Co. v. NLRB, 397 F.2d 760 (4 th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Southland Paint Co., 394 F.2d 717 (sth Cir.
1968); NLRB v. Lewis, 246 F.2d 886 (9 th Cir. X957); United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co.,
183 F. Supp. 568 (E.D. Pa. 196o); Brooks Dodge Lumber Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1054 (1966), enforced,
389 F.2d 1oo5 (9th Cir. x968); Rome Products CO., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217 (948); Schieher Millinery Co.,
26 N.L.R.B. 937 (194o); Klotz & Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 746 (1939). If, however, the employer can show that
the move is made in the good-faith belief that it is necessary for economic or other valid business
purpose reasons, it is permissible. See NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961); Mt. Hope
Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 365 (4 th Cir. 1954); Royal Plating & Polishing Co., Inc., 152 N.L.R.B.
619 (1965), enforcement denied, 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965); Dove Flocking & Screening Co., 145
COLLECrIE BARGAINING 25
general types of terms in sports agreements shall be analyzed to assess the impact
of collective bargaining upon particular agreement provisions.
A. The Minimum Terms and Conditions of Employment Provision
Although the superstar, in the absence of collective bargaining, may negotiate a
contract applicable only to himself, once a bargaining unit is certified by the NLRB,
N.L.R.B. 682 (1963); Royal Optical Mfg. Co., Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 64 (1962); Kipbea Baking Co., Inc.,
131 N.L.R.B. 411 (g6i); Brown Truck & Trailer Mfg. Co., Inc., io6 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953). Difficulty
arises when the owner's duty to bargain over the change is considered. Although the NLRB has made
its position clear that an economically motivated decision to relocate is a mandatory subject of bargaining
within the purview of section 8(a)(5), see Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966); see also Morrison
Cafeterias Consolidated, Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. 113 (1969), enforcement denied in part, 431 F.2d 254 (8th
Cir. 1970); Miller Trucking Service, Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (1969); Drapery Mfg. Co., Inc., 17o N.L.R.B.
199 (1968); Thompson Transport Co., Inc., 165 N.L.R.B. 96 (1967), enforcement denied, 406 F.2d
698 (zoth Cir. 1969); McLoughlin Mfg. Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 140 (x967); Pierce Governor Co., 164
N.L.R.B. 97 (1967), several courts of appeal have taken a contrary position. See Morrison Cafeterias
Consolidated Inc. v. NLRB, 431 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Thompson Transport Co., 406 F.2d
698 (ioth Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1967); NLRB v.
Royal Plating & Polishing Co., Inc., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d
io8 (8th Cir. 1965); Mt. Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 365 (4 th Cir. 1954). The conflict
between the Board and the courts of appeal is considered in MoRius, supra note 41, at 418-22; Fair-
weather, The NLRB-Implementer of the National Labor Policy or Vice Versa?, 22 LAB. LJ. 294, 304-06
(1971). This conflict, however, poses little real difficulty. If the Board's view were to prevail, all that
the employer must do is notify the union of its intention and then proceed to bargain about the
decision in good faith. If such efforts fail, in spite of the good faith bargaining, "the employer is
[then] wholly free to make and effectuate his decision." Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 56i, 568
(i96i). If, on the other hand, the disagreeing court of appeals' viewpoint prevails, the employer is still
said to have a duty to bargain about the effects of the decision, although he need not bargain about
the decision itself. Morrison Cafeterias Consolidated, Inc., v.NLRB, 431 F.ad 254 (8th Cir. 1970);
NLRB v. McLoughlin Transport, 406 F.2d 698 (ioth Cir. x969); NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation
Corp., 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Adams Dairy, 350 F.2d io8 (8th Cir. x965); NLRB v.
Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d i91 (3 d Cir. 1965). The duty to bargain over effects, more-
over, will be satisfied by the employer's notification to the union of its decision, and if the union
chooses to request no such bargaining, the employer will not be found to have violated its section
8(a)(5) duty. Young Motor Truck Service, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 56 (1966). Whether one chooses to
follow the Board or the courts of appeal makes little real difference, of course, since the requirement to
bargain over effects differs only in degree from the duty to bargain over the decision itself. See Morrison
Cafeterias Consolidated, Inc., v. NLRB, 431 F.2d 254, 257-58 (8th Cir. X970).
When a franchise is sought to be moved, then, the bargaining duties are fairly well spelled out if
the "runaway shop" rules in fact apply. Thus, it seems dear that if the profit motive necessitates a
change in the location of a sports franchise--that is, a partial closing as opposed to a complete shut-
down-the owner will not commit a section 8(a)(3) unfair labor practice. See Ozark Trailers, Inc.,
161 N.L.R.B. 56i, 564-65 (i966); see also Schnell Tool & Die Corp., i62 N.L.R.B. 1313, 1316 (1967).
Unfortunately, this is about all that is clear, because the sports industry has several unique features.
Movement of a professional sports franchise is not quite the same as a runaway shop, inasmuch as the
owner controls the employment options of his players and can compel them to follow the franchise.
Thus, the parties must decide what effect this difference has upon the "rules." In this particular case,
perhaps the effect is to make the question of franchise movement a mandatory subject of bargaining to
begin with, so that the players should seek explicit and detailed recognition of their rights consequent
upon such movement in the collective bargaining agreement. Since it may then be a mandatory sub-
ject, moreover, the players could support their bargaining position by standing upon all economic
weapons at their disposal.
This is at best a rough example of the ambiguity caused by applying a relatively well established
body of rules in a new context, but it should at least identify the basic difficulty presented by the
application of the labor laws to the professional team sport industry.
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the elected representative becomes the exclusive bargaining agent for all employees
within the unit. 20 Thus, individual employees no longer have complete freedom to
bargain on their own.' 2 If individual bargaining is carried on in conflict with the
efforts of a certified bargaining agent, moreover, the employer may commit an unfair
labor practice by failing to bargain collectively with the representatives of the
majority of his employees'
Since the collective bargaining agreement negotiated by a players' union will prob-
ably continue to cover only the minimum wages and conditions of employment,128
it is necessary to explore in some detail the rules which will apply to individual super-
star bargaining on terms in excess of the common minimum. As a general matter,
it may be observed that an employer will be considered to have violated his statutory
duty to bargain if he deals directly with an employee, or any other agent who is not
the certified representative, 24 and who is a member of the bargaining unit,128 because
by so acting the employer undermines the authority of the union and prevents effec-
tive collective bargaining, a major purpose of the NLRA. 20 Once a collective agree-
ment has been properly reached, however, an individual, but not the union,127 may
negotiate for an individual contract the terms of which exceed, but do not derogate
from, those contained in the collective agreement. 28 When such a contract is negoti-
ated the collective agreement is said to be incorporated into the qualifying individual
contract' 9
"'0National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § i59(a) (1970). Thus, the opinion expressed in
Senate hearings that the majority of the ballplayers could not bind the remainder, see Hearings Before the
Senate Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senae Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Scss.
ixo-zi (1964), is clearly in error.
"'
1 See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 18o (z967); Steele v. Louisville & Nash-
ville Ry., 323 U.S. 192, 200 (944). But cf. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental
Iron Workers, Local No. 494, 128 N.L.R.B. 1379 (X960), where the Board held a union to be in violation
of sections 8(b)(s) and 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 58(b)(I), (2) (970), when it excluded an employee
who had succeeded in obtaining higher pay on his own.
"National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. 3 158(a)(5) (970). See also National
Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 357-59 (1940). Thus, in Dazey Corp., ,o6 N.L.1)3. 553 (x958),
the Board held that such action could violate section 8(a)(5) for failing to bargain with the ma-
jority, as well as section 8(a)(x) for encouraging the minority to abandon the majority.
12 See NFL AGREEMENT art. IV, § 1. See also Shulman & Baum, supra note 2, at 174; Note, Curt
Flood at Bat Against Baseball's Reserve Clause, 8 Sx DiEco L. REV. 92, 94 n.12 (1971).
"'See Peoples Motor Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 165 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1948); Mutual Industries, Inc.,
z59 N.L.R.B. 885 (1966), enforced, 387 F.2d 275 (9 th Cir. 1967).
" See Smith's Van & Transit Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 1o59 (196o).
'See J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (I944); NLRB v. Cooke & Jones, Inc., 337 F.2d 58o
(ist Cir. x964); NLRB v. Union Mfg. Co., 179 F.2d 5I1 (5th Cir. 195o). This rule applies equally to
the modification of contracts. Adolph Coors Co., 15o N.L.R.B. 16D4 (1965); Williams Coal Co., xx
N.L.R.B. 579 (x939). A union may, however, acquiesce in a practice of non-representative negotiation,
and when the employer then bargains with those employees, it is not in violation of its section 8(a) (5)
duty.
' 12"See UAW v. J. I. Case Co., 250 Wis. 63, 26 N.W.2d 305 (1947). See also NLRB v. Darlington
Veneer Co., 236 F.2d 85, 89 n.2 (4 th Cir. 1956).
""u J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 339 (1944).
29Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 2XO F.ad 623
(3 d Cir. 1954); but cf. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
348 U.S. 437 (9.55) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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The clearest application of these rules was made by the Supreme Court in J. I. Case
Co. v. NLRB,'30 in which it observed that "where there is great variation in [the]
capacity of employees, it is possible for the collective bargain to prescribe only min-
imum rates or maximum hours or expressly to leave certain areas open to individual
bargaining."'' Any such practice must, however, be looked upon "with suspicion,"
since the conferral of such advantage may be "disruptive of industrial peace" and be
"at the long-range expense of the group as a whole."'1 2 Where such contracts are per-
missible, moreover, the Court said that they may not "subtract from the collective
ones.')133
1. I. Case, then, is instructive for the present inquiry only to the extent that it
carves out a narrow area within which a superstar may negotiate for terms in excess
of a minimum standards contract-that is, where there is a great variation in the
capacity of the members of the bargaining unit and where the individual contracts
are not less advantageous than the collective bargain. Although there are no de-
cisions in this area involving athletic superstars as such, there is authority in the
entertainment field.3 4 In Midland Broadcasting Co.,'35 the employer negotiated a
collective bargaining agreement which included a provision providing for the negoti-
ation of better terms than those contained in the "union contract." Relying upon this
provision, the employer then negotiated individual "talent" contracts with its artists,
which afforded the artist an opportunity to earn a bonus over the minimum rates of
pay guaranteed by the union contracts but which also placed restrictions on the
artists' performance for anyone except the immediate employer 3 6 These individual
contracts were challenged as being violative of the employer's duty under section
8(a) (5) to bargain in good faith, inasmuch as they contained less favorable terms than
did the union contract-that is, they were not within the narrow rule of I. I. Case.
The Board, however, found no such violation, and upheld the contracts saying that
"[i]t is not sufficient... to show that a particular provision of the talent contract,
taken by itself, is less favorable than a particular term of the union contract."'137
What the Board seems to have held, therefore, is that in determining the per-
missibility of an individual contract, it is the totality of the contract that must be
13o 321 U.S. 332 (1944)-
.
1
. d. at 338.
"" Id. at 338-39.
180 Id. at 339.
13& See generally Tower, Labor Relations in the Broadcasting Industry, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 62,
89-90 (1958).
135 93 N.L.R.B. 455 (I952). See also Television Film Producers Ass'n, 93 N.L.R.B. 929, 930 (1951).
"' It is not without significance that the restriction bears more than a passing resemblance to the
reserve and option clauses, that are now generating so much controversy. Inasmuch as the Board sanc-
tioned this type of clause in Midland Broadcasting, one might seek to argue that the reserve clause is also
a proper term in a collective bargaining contract under the NLRA. Such argument would also indicate
that the status of the clause under the antitrust laws is largely irrelevant. See Jacobs & Winter, supra note
34, at 17-28, though that article did not rely upon authority comparable to Midland Broadcasting.
'aT 93 N.L.R.B. at 456. The Board observed that "[i]f we were to strike down the burdensome pro-
visions and leave only the bonus provisions . . . .we would be making a new and different contract
for the parties. That is not the function of this Board."
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considered, not particular terms. Thus, according to Midland Broadcasting, a less
favorable term may be negotiated without an employer violation of section 8(a) (5)
so long as the totality of the individual contract is not less favorable than the totality
of the union contract. Although the "totality theory" is attractive, its underpinnings
are rather weak. In light of the language in J. I. Case that less favorable terms may
not be negotiated in individual contracts, 3 8 the course of wisdom will be to assume
that the standard against which any individual provisions will be tested is one which
compares the individual and union contracts "term by term," not by the totality of
terms. Though it might be argued that such an approach would not pose much
difficulty, since it is only the salary term which is presently the subject of individual
negotiation in the professional team sport industry, there are other "individual"
terms in particular player contracts-for example, it is reported that some players
are able to negotiate no-cut or no-trade clauses in their contracts.' Like the higher-
than-minimum salary terms, however, such clauses are more, not less, favorable than
the standard contract provisions and would not run afoul of either the J. I. Case or
Midland Broadcasting rules.
It is clear, then, that superstars need not suffer economic loss because of the
advent of collective bargaining and that the club owner need not risk a section
8 (a) (5) unfair labor practice by negotiating a minimum standards contract with the
players association and an individual contract with the more talented players, so long
as the proper negotiation procedure is followed.140 The association should first ne-
gotiate a minimum standards contract which contains all terms and conditions of
employment and which, as in Midland Broadcasting,141 also contains a specific pro-
vision allowing individual members of the bargaining unit to negotiate for more
favorable terms than those contained in the collective agreement.142 When the col-
lective agreement is complete, the individual may then negotiate for the more
favorable terms that he deems a necessary quid pro quo for his services, assuming
always that the collective agreement is part and parcel of whatever individual agree-
ment he may reach with the employer.
i. The Union's Duty of Fair Representation
In considering the right to bargain individually, it is also necessary to consider the
fact that the players association may itself be subject to a charge that such a negoti-
ation procedure violates its duty of fair representation. The basis of such a con-
... See notes 130-33 supra and accompanying text.
"' See z957 Hearings, pt. 3, supra note 2, at 2650.
240 See Jacobs & Winter, supra note 34, at 9-o.
"' The specific clause involved in Midland Broadcasting was as follows:
The Company further agrees that nothing in this contract shall be deemed to prevent any staff
artist from negotiating for or obtaining better terms than the minimum terms provided herein ....
93 N.L.R.B. at 455 n.X.
14' In the 197o NFL Agreement, for example, it is provided that "individual NFL players have the
right to negotiate regular season compensation above the minimums established in this Agreement."
NFL AGREEMENT, art. IV, § r.
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tendon would be that by negotiating for a contract which set merely minimum
standards, the association failed to fairly represent the vast majority of its members,
since if the contract had included a detailed wage schedule applicable to all members,
the majority would have benefited from the inclusion of superstars in the schedule-
that is, it seems clear that if a wage schedule is negotiated at fixed levels, with no
provision for individual bargaining above the bargained for figures, the presence of
the superstars in the bargaining unit will cause the levels adopted to be higher than
if they were not present.143 Any such salary term would be, of course, highly
detrimental to the superstars. The issue, therefore, is whether the duty of fair repre-
sentation permits the union to negotiate a minimum standards contract which makes
provision for additional compensation to the more talented members of the bar-
gaining unit.144
The duty of fair representation was originally established by the Supreme Court
in a series of opinions arising under the Railway Labor Act, 45 but has since been
applied to the NLRA.'46 The first explanation of the doctrine came in Steele v.
Louisville and Nashville Railway Co.,'47 which was based upon racial discrimination
complaints. There the Court held that a labor organization must "represent all its
members, the majority as well as the minority, and it is to act for and not against
those whom it represents."'i4 That is, the representative must act "without hostile
discrimination" amongst its members. 49 As it had done earlier that year in J. L
Case, however, the Court allowed room for the union to make provision for the ex-
ceptionally talented amongst its membership. The Court said that variations in the
terms of the contract may be made so long as they are based on "relevant differ-
ences" amongst the employees, "such as differences in seniority, the type of work
performed, [and] the competence and skill with which it is performed."'150
There does not, unfortunately, appear to be any decisional authority dealing with
a situation comparable to that involved in the negotiations for minimum standards
contracts and individual bargaining by superstars. In light of the language of Steele,
however, there is little chance that a union would be held to have violated its fair
""sSee Rottenberg, The Baseball Players' Labor Market, 64 J. POL. ECON. 242, 250 (1956).
It is, in this light, of interest to note that the agreement in the NFL has, as noted at note 142 supra, a
minimum salary term for the regular season salaries with provisions for individual higher than minimum
salary negotiations. For pre-season games, however, there is a schedular salary scale, with the amount
received depending upon the length of service. NFL AGREamENT art. IV, § 3. This at least indicates that
schedular salaries have a foothold in the professional team sport industry. Whether they will ever be
applied to regular season salaries is, of course, a question without present answer.
I it is to be noted that in Midland Broadcasting, the Board did not raise this question. It did seem
to indicate, however, that if such a complaint were processed through the grievance procedure, it might
then be a proper subject for its scrutiny.
' Now codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-58 (1970).
' Syres v. Oil Workers, Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330(1953).
147 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
"
8 Id. at 202. See generally Lehmann, The Union's Duty of Fair Representation-Steele and Its
Successors, 30 FED. BAR. J. 28o (1971).
149 323 U.S. at 203. See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 17i, 177 (1967).
go 323 U.S. at 203.
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representation duty by negotiating the minimum standards contract which puts
those with superior skill in an advantageous position vis-a'-vis their less talented
peers, assuming, of course, the absence of a discriminatory motive and the presence
of overall membership benefit.'5
2. A Maximum Salary Term
The preceding discussion has assumed that a minimum salary contract is negoti-
ated. That, of course, is the present, and most easily envisioned, situation.1 2 It is not,
however, clear that a players' union might not opt for a maximum salary contract
based upon schedular salary figures' 53 -that is, a contract which more clearly re-
sembles those negotiated in other industries. Such a contract would, in fact, appear
to make economic sense to the non-star players, who presumably would benefit from
such a "common denominator" approach. 4 Since they would certainly constitute a
majority of the bargaining unit, the non-stars could surely compel the bargaining
representative to negotiate such a contract. If a maximum salary contract were
negotiated, moreover, the superstars would have no basis for legal complaint.15 That
contract would be for the overall benefit of the bargaining unit as a whole, and the
mere substitution of majority for minority advantage would certainly not constitute
"hostile discrimination" such as to constitute the necessary predicate for a fair repre-
sentation challenge. In addition, the superstars would be barred from negotiating
on their own, for if the employer bargained with them as individuals, whether or
151 See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Thomson v. International Alliance of
Theatrical Stage Employees, 232 Cal. App. 2d 446, 42 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1965).
"5 Maximum salary schedules have, in fact, been used in baseball in times past, with length of service
providing the schedular maxima. H.R. RaP. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 32, '59, 173 (1952).
... Such a schedular scale has, in fact, been negotiated in the NFL for pre-season games. See NFL
AoasmzENs art. IV, §3; Labor Relations in Professional Sports, supra note 2, at 78. It is worth noting,
however, that Bob Feller, one-time head of the Major League Players Association, once said that "I
definitely do not think that collective bargaining could be put into baseball in salary talks . z. " 5957
Heaings, pt. 2, supra note 2, at 1330.
... Thus, it has been observed that
there are players, stars and superstars, who unquestionably have far greater bargaining power in-
dividually . . . than they would have if the bargaining was conducted for them by an [collective
bargaining] agent [representing all players, stars as well as non-stars].
Labor Relations in Professional Sports, supra note 2, at 75. It would also seem to put the players
association in a more advantageous bargaining position. Thus, it has been observed that the effect of
the minimum salary term has been to sharply reduce
the Union's role as bargaining agent and has resulted in greater emphasis by the Union on the
matters remaining within the area of collective bargaining. It has forced the Clubs to consider
simultaneously the cost impact of money matters in collective bargaining and the cost impact of
individual demands.
Id. at 91.
... Thus, it has been observed that
[i]f minimum salaries can be negotiated, so too can maximum salaries. But if maximum salaries
are held to be illegal in baseball because they discriminate against the best players, then they
should also be illegal in the steel industry because they discriminate against the best steelworkers.
It is elitist to view industrial workers as fungible and to treat them as though there are no differ-
ences in efficiency.
Jacobs & Winter, supra note 34, at 21.
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not they were members of the union, he would be committing an unfair labor prac-
tice under section 8(a) ().156 Once a bargaining representative is elected, it repre-
sents all members of the bargaining unit in negotiations with employers on wages
and all other terms and conditions of employment, and, absent discrimination
violative of fair representation, all members must rely on internal union politics to
secure their own advantage. 57 And, as has already been observed, the superstars
will probably not be able to successfully invoke partial withdrawal or severance pro-
cedures to establish their own bargaining unit should the majority seek to submit
the individual benefit of the stars to the overall good of all players. 58
B. The Allocation of Players
The allocation of players is yet another feature of the professional team sport
environment which will unquestionably be a part of the collective bargaining process.
Allocation takes place at all points in a particular player's career. Initially, he is the
subject of a common draft which will determine for which team he may or may
not play. During his career he may be traded without his' consent pursuant to con-
tract and bylaw provisions 5 " or be put into a common pool for expansion purposes.
If he plays out his option in football or basketball, 00 his volitional relocation may
be conditioned upon the club with which he seeks association compensating the dub
he is leaving;' 0 and if he plays baseball, the reserve clause will prevent any volun-
tary change in employment.'62 All of these rules have the ostensible purposes of en-
. See notes 120-22 supra and accompanying text.
" Thus, it has been recently observed that the "existence of unions in professional sports thus negates
any possibility of individual bargaining except as permitted by the collective bargain." Jacobs & Winter,
supra note 34, at 9.
.. See notes 104-x6 supra and accompanying text.
... Thus, the NFL Standard Player Contract provides that
[i]t is mutually agreed that the Club shall have the right to sell, exchange, assign or transfer this
contract and the Player's services hereunder to any other Club in this League.
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE STANDARD PLAYER CONTRACT § 9. This clause has been attacked as lacking
mutuality, and that it does, therefore, confer an unconscionable advantage on the owners. z957 Hearings,
pt. 2, at 2644.
'
0 The option clause in football reads as follows:
The Club may, by sending notice in writing to the Player ...renew this contract for a further
term of one (i) year on the same terms as are provided by this contract, except that (i) the Club
may fix the rate of compensation to be paid ...which.., shall not be less than ninety percent
(9o%) of the sum set forth [herein] . . . ; and (2) after such renewal this contract shall not
include a further option to the Club to renew the contract.
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE STANmAR PLAYER CoNTRACT § ix; see also NFL AGREEMENT art. VIII.
""
1 This rule is contained in NFL CoNsTrTUToN & Bv.tws art. 12.1 (H), and is referred to as
"Rozelle's Rule" by the players. See Labor Relations in Professional Sports, supra note 2 at r6, 24,
29. See generally Wall Street journal, Aug. 23, x967, at 19, col. 3; 1964 Hearings io6-07; Brown, Be-
cause o1 a Clause, a Clause, SpoTs Its STTrEmD, May 1, 1972, at 62; Note, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption
and the Reserve System: Reappraisal of an Anachronism, 12 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 859, 874-75 (1971).
A similar provision has been proposed in the National Basketball Association. See Professional Basketball
Merger, pt. x, supra note 62, at 153.
'x The reserve clause is basically provided for in Major League and Professional Baseball Rules, where
it is said that each club may place its players on a reserve list, "and thereafter no player on any list
shall be eligible to play for or negotiate with any other club until his contract has been assigned or he has
been released." Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 796-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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suring that players will not willy-nilly shift from team to team, thereby in-
capacitating personnel planning, interfering with the stimulation of spectator iden-
tification, and, of course, inflaming price competition amongst teams, which will all
greatly increase the costs of fielding a competitive team.
This scheme of rules may be classified for present purposes as simply different
means of restricting the players', but not the owners', ability to determine for whom
they shall play in the future. Because of their clearly restraining nature, the different
rules have frequently been the subject of antitrust challenge in the courts. Although
the reserve clause in baseball is clearly the most restrictive, it has been upheld against
antitrust challenge for several decades, 0 3 as have the option clauses in basketball,
football and hockey.'"
The reserve system was once described by former owner Bill Veeck as "motherhood, the flag and apple
pie all rolled into one," as far as the owners were themselves concerned. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 23, 1967,
at 19, col. 4. The players have been heard to say "that it is totally illegal and not a bargainable posi-
tion, it violates the antitrust laws and is illegal." Labor Relations in Professional Sports, supra note 2,
at 68. The pros and cons of the reserve clause are considered in H.R. RaP. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. 208-28 (x952).
1.. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953);
Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
...See Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 419 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1969); Houston
Oilers, Inc. v. Neely, 361 F.2d 36 (ioth Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 840, rehearing denied, 385 U.S. 942
(r966); Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal.
App. 2d 671, 8o Cal. Rptr. 240 (1969); Central New York Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett, 19 Ohio Op. 2d
130, 181 N.E.ad 5o6 (i961); Dallas Cowboys Football Club v. Harris, 348 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App.
i961). But cf. Nassau Sports v. Hampton, 355 F. Supp. 733 (D. Minn. 1972); Philadelphia World Hockey
Club v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Boston Professional Hockey
Ass'n v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass. 1972). It has normally been challenged by players who
have "jumped leagues," in an effort to muster a defense against the injunction suit which is invariably
brought against them by their former employer. Some courts have viewed the contracts in question as
being contracts of adhesion requiring that they be strictly construed against the owners, see, e.g., Lemat
Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal. App. 2d 671, 8o Cal. Rptr. 240, 245 (x969); but cf. Washington Capitols
Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 304 F. Supp. X193, 1197 (N.D. Cal.), afi'd, 419 F.2d 472 (9th Cir.
z969). Others have granted the injunctions, though they have generally been limited to the period of
the option, see, e.g., Houston Oilers, Inc. v. Neely, 361 F.2d 36 (ioth Cir. z966), at least so long as there
is no showing of "unclean hands" on the part of the prior owner. See New York Football Giants, Inc.
v. Los Angeles Chargers Football Club, Inc., 291 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1961); Minnesota Muskies, Inc.
v. Hudson, 294 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C. 1969) (plaintiff had so soiled its hands during the contract
negotiation process that the court felt required to invoke the equitable "clean-hands" rule against it);
but cf. Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 49 F.2d 472, 478 (9 th Cir. 1969). There
is, therefore, nothing as a matter of general contract law improper about the restraint on mobility posed
bjy the option clause. Thus, in Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 304 F. Supp. x193
(N.D. Cal.), a0'd 419 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1969); the court observed that such provisions are not of
themselves "unconscionable, unenforcible or otherwise void." Id. at 1197.
It is worthwhile to indicate the rationale upon which the courts seem to base their decisions. The
basic view is that in contracts involving personal services, the parties may negotiate a negative covenant
to ensure that the employer gets the exclusive right to display the player for a given period of time.
Thus, they follow the venerable English decision of Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (x853), to
grant injunctions to ensure that the player plays for no one else during the period of the contract. The
courts will not, however, sanction a long-term contract; at least they will not enjoin a player from play-
ing elsewhere for more than one or two years, depending on the length of the contract and the option
involved. The reason for this is that unlike other types of personal services, the services rendered by ball-
players are ephemeral and will last for only a short period. They must, therefore, have at some point
the freedom to negotiate for better terms of employment. See Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal. App. 2d
671, 8o Cal. Rptr. 240, 245 n.9 (1969).
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In none of these cases, however, have the courts been presented with the per-
missibility of such rules as a part of a collective bargaining agreement." 5 As has
already been observed, when a term of a collective bargaining agreement is chal-
lenged as being in contravention of the antitrust laws, the plaintiff should be able
to succeed only if he shows that the term does not relate to "wages, hours or work-
ing conditions," that it was not arrived at through bona fide collective bargaining
and that the players' bargaining agent was acting in consort with the owners and
did not fulfill its duty of fair representation. 66 Absent such a showing, the term
should not be stricken, with the result that the unhappy challenger would be left to
his remedy under the labor laws.' This is an entirely justifiable result, since it is
the labor laws, not the antitrust laws, which should determine the permissibility of
terms contained in collective bargaining agreements, except in the rare cases where
a plaintiff can successfully carry the burden of proof already considered.
When these mobility restrictions are analyzed under the labor laws, it seems
fairly clear that there is nothing, as a prima facie matter, impermissible about their
inclusion in a collective bargaining agreement' 68 With regard to the reserve and
option clauses, reference might be made to Midland Broadcasting Co.,'6 9 where, as
already noted,' 70 the employers inserted in the collective bargaining agreement, in
addition to the minimum salary term, a restraint on the entertainers' performing
for any other party. The Board, however, failed to even comment upon this pro-
vision, except to note that its purpose was "designed . . .to assure that the . ..
[employer] would receive the exclusive benefit of its investment in the artist"'-'
the same purpose behind the reserve and option clauses. Though this lack of com-
ment does not, to be sure, indicate that the Board has placed its imprimatur upon
mobility restraints, it does seem to indicate that the mobility restraint is simply an-
other of the items available to the collective bargaining participants. In short, it is
believed that so long as the mobility restraint adopted for use in the professional
team sport industry is permissible as a means of general contract law-and, of course,
.. An attempt was made to do so in Flood v. Kuhn, but the Supreme Court never reached the
question. The argument was, however, noted by justice Marshall in his dissent, 407 U.S. at 294,
as it had been by the courts below. See 443 F.2d at 268; 309 F. Supp. at 8o6. A similar attempt
was made in Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass. 1972), but was
rejected because of there being no evidence that the hockey reserve clause had ever been the subject of
collective bargaining negotiations. See generally, Martin, The Labor Controversy in Professional Base-
ball: The Flood Case, 23 LAB. L.J. 567 (1972).
""See notes 27-55 supra and accompanying text. Thus, the oft invoked opinion of the players asso-
ciations that such clauses violate the antitrust laws, see Labor Relations in Professional Sports, supra
note 2, at 68, is in error, and their efforts should be directed toward ameliorating the effects of such
clauses at the bargaining table.
""7 See Labor Relations in Professional Sports, supra note 2, at 87.
"'In light of this conclusion, one is bound to view the action proposed by Senator Ervin to con-
gressionally outlaw the reserve clause, see Indianapolis Star, Aug. 1o, 1972, at 48, col. i, as being an
overly emotional response to what is at best simply another difficult labor problem in American industry.log93 N.L.R.B. 455 (1951)•
17 See notes 135-37 supra and accompanying text.
171 93 N.L.R.B. at 456.
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antitrust law-it will be permissible in the collective bargaining arena.172 Since any
such restraint is certainly a "term or condition" of employment, moreover, it is a
mandatory subject of bargaining about which the parties must bargain but need not
reach agreement.
When the player drafts are considered, a similar approach should be taken toward
determining their permissibility in collective bargaining. The college drafts serve
the same type of restrictive purpose as do the other mobility restraints-that is, to
reduce the outlay of bonus money on untried rookies and to equalize playing talent
in order that pennant competition will be stimulating and intense.7'7 Although the
player draft has been said by the Supreme Court to present a significant group boy-
cott issue in the antitrust context,7 4 it seems to be perfectly permissible as a matter
within the realm of collective bargaining.
The basic objection to the player draft itself has been that it deprives the entrants
to the market-that is, the incoming rookies--of the right to make their own bar-
gain with the team of their own choice at a time when they are not a part of the
collective bargaining process that agreed to the draft. Although that objection has
merit, there is ample labor law authority for such provisions. In Local 24, Teamsters
Union v. Oliver,75 the Supreme Court stated that a collective bargaining agreement
could regulate the entry of certain third parties to work being performed by members
of the then present bargaining unit, though the third parties were not a part of the
bargaining process. Similarly, in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB,'17 the
Supreme Court required that the parties bargain about the "contracting out" of
work, although by doing so those parties would, to some extent, be regulating the
entry of non-present third parties to the work in question. Though these cases
are not directly applicable, and not, therefore, dispositive of the issue, they are in-
dicative of the fact that as a matter of collective bargaining such procedures are not
in and of themselves impermissible.17
The player draft does, of course, have a rough counterpart in industrial labor
""When the player allocation rules are submitted to collective bargaining, many variations on the
option and reserve clause may be forthcoming. Several possibilities are suggested in Flood v. Kuhn, 36
F. Supp. 27X, 275 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. X970); Note, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption and the Reserve System:
Reappraisal of an Anachronism, 12 Wmr. & MARY L. Rlv. 859, 874-76 (197x). See also Professional
Basketball Merger, supra note 62, at 153, where it is reported that the NBA has proposed that instead of
the option clause there be instituted a right of first refusal -that is, in Senator Hruska's words
if a player, number i, is with Club A and getting $soo,ooo a year, and some other club offers him
$150,000 a year, the home club can keep him if they match the $15o,ooo; but if they don't he
can move.
Id.
17 See R. A, RNao, No Joy IN MuDvILLE 184 (1965).
'
1 4 See Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1207 (197). It is also to be noted
that the NBA rule preventing a player from becoming eligible for the player draft until four years
have elapsed since his high school graduation, has been declared to be an unlawful group boycott.
Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
175 3 5 8 U.S. 283 (1959).
17 379 U.S. 203 (1964)-
1'7 See Jacobs & Winter, supra note 34, at 15-16.
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relations in the hiring hall, for which the NLRB and the courts have worked out a
relatively clear scheme of rules. The basic function of the hiring hall is to eliminate
wasteful, time-consuming, and repetitive scouting for jobs by individual workmen, as
well as haphazard and uneconomical searches by employers,' 7s by performing what
amounts to a clearinghouse function for a particular labor market. The rules which
presently cover such arrangements were first set out in Local 357, Teamsters Union v.
NLRB,179 where the Court held that hiring hall arrangements were improper only
where they were operated in a discriminatory manner to the expense of non-union
members' 8 0
As is the player draft, the hiring hall is simply one means of accomplishing the
desired result of allocating employees at the least cost and effort. The hiring hall is,
of course, distinguishable from the player draft to the extent that in the hiring hall
the employee may or may not accept the job to which he is referred, whereas the
player draft is a "mandatory arrangement" in which the player has no choice. None-
theless, such systems have a proper place in the collective bargaining process, as is
evidenced by Fibreboard, Oliver and the hiring hall cases. When the draft is con-
sidered as a bargaining matter, moreover, it would appear to be a mandatory subject
of bargaining, as was the "contracting out" clause in Fibreboard, since where a
player is assigned will clearly have an effect on the "terms or conditions" of his em-
ployment, although those being drafted will not, of course, be members of the bar-
gaining unit at the time of negotiations.
This is by no means an exhaustive discussion of the labor law implications of the
various means used to restrict the mobility of players. The consideration of the
reserve and option clauses and the player draft are, however, sufficient to illustrate the
theory that should surround the collective bargaining table. So long as the parties
comply with their prescribed bargaining duties, the agreement that is reached will
not be invalidated under the labor laws, and the bargaining agent of the players
will not be subject to collateral attack so long as he fairly represents the majority
of those in his bargaining unit. In addition, a disappointed player will not be able
to have a particular clause set aside as being in violation of the antitrust laws unless
he can carry the rather stringent burden of proof hereinbefore considered.
V
STRIKES AND LoCKouTs
The activity that will provide, perhaps, the most tangible evidence of the in-
cursion of the federal labor law into the arenas of professional sport will be the
"SSee Mountain Pacific Chapter, 119 N.L.R.B. 883, 896 (x958), enforcement denied, 270 F.2d 425
(9 th Cir. 1959).170 365 U.s. 667 (1961).
"'In so doing, the Court repudiated a more specific precautionary formula established by the NLRe.
See Mountain Pacific Chapter, x19 N.L.R.B. 883 (1958). For a more lengthy discussion of hiring
halls, see Momus, supra note 41, at 712-14.
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efforts of both owners and players to utilize their economic weapons to enforce
bargaining table positions or to rectify other grievances. Resort to economic warfare
is, in a sense, the essence of the collective bargaining process,"-' inasmuch as that
process is simply a procedurally formal means of requiring opposing parties to re-
solve their disputes and opposing self-interests. When this cannot be done peacefully,
then the contest of economic weapons becomes the means by which controversies are
won, lost, or compromised-that is, the party whose economic ability is strongest
prevails. In this sense, then, the study of strikes and lockouts-the primary economic
weapons respectively, of the players and owners-is relevant to the present inquiry
as a simple means of evidencing the type of activity that can be expected when
owners and players reach impasse at the bargaining table or elsewhere.
A. The Players' Right to Strike
The primary weapon in the players' arsenal of economic weapons is the strike,
which is defined as the act of employees refusing to work as a means of coercing their
employer to accede to a demand that they have made upon him but which he has re-
fused."' Though neither the Constitution nor the common law provides employees
with an absolute right to strike,'3 federal statutory law makes it a potent weapon
by declaring that the action of employees terminating their employment or ceasing
to perform work shall not violate the law of the United States, 84 and that the federal
courts shall have no power to issue temporary restraining orders or temporary or
permanent injunctions against activities growing out of labor disputes.8 5 The most
important provisions, however, are those contained in the NLRA, which guarantee
employees the right to engage in strikes and other forms of concerted activities,"8 "
and that the right to strike shall not be impeded or diminished by any of its pro-
visions, except as may be therein specifically stated.'7 These provisions show, simply,
that the right to strike is accorded considerable solicitude, and that when properly
'Thus, in NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (196o), the Court noted that
"[t]he presence of economic weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on occasion by the parties,
is part and parcel of the system ... ." Id. at 489.
... See Jeffrey-DeWitt Insulator Co. v. NLRB, 91 F.2d 134, 138 (4 th Cir. 1937). See also Point
Reyes, ixo F.2d 6o8, 6o9-so (5th Cir. 1940) (equating "strike" with the presence of an employee-
employer relation in which the former have quit work).
.
8 See Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926).
184 Clayton Act § 20, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970).
"r Norris-LaGuardia Act § I, 29 U.S.C. § IOX (i97o). Similar anti-injunction provisions have been
enacted by several states. See generally Mosms, supra note 41, at 522 n.22.
'8 National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). Section 7 also gives employees the
right to refrain from participating in any such activities.
"'National Labor Relations Act § 13, 29 U.S.C. § x63 (1970). NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373
U.S. 221, 233 (x963). The specific exceptions to this rule are contained in National Labor Relations
Act § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. §r58(b)(4) (970), and include, amongst other things, strikes to obtain
so-called "hot cargo" agreements, secondary boycotts and to settle work assignment disputes. A further
restriction is in id. § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § x58(d) (1970), which requires a 6o-day "cooling.off" period
when a party is seeking to modify or terminate an existing collective bargaining agreement, during which
a strike may not be lawfully employed.
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employed' it is an economic weapon which "implements and supports the principle
of the collective bargaining system."' s9
The right to strike is not, however, without limitation, so that even when on strike
the union will be bound by its obligation to bargain in good faith, 9 ' and will lose
its protection when it consents to the inclusion of a "no-strike" clause in a collective
bargaining agreement,' 9 ' or when it engages in activity that involves either an un-
lawful objective 92 or the use of improper means.O 3 In addition, the employer may
undertake to impose sanctions upon the strikers. His ability to do so, however, will
be limited by the fact that a striking employee remains, nonetheless, an "employee"' 94
-that is, he retains his "protected" status-and by whether the strike is predicated
upon the employer's unfair labor practices or upon the employees' own economic
desires. If it is an unfair labor practice strike, the employees who have not par-
ticipated in strike misconduct or been discharged for cause'95 are entitled to rein-
statement""8 and to vote in all elections,197 even if replacements have been hired. In
an economic strike, however, the employer may hire replacements and need not re-
employ the striking employees,'98 but, because the strike is still protected activity,
the employer may not discriminate against a striker on account of his strike ac-
tivity,199 unless that activity itself constitutes misconduct200
... A strike will be properly employed only if it arises in a "labor dispute," which is defined to in-
clude
any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking
to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee.
National Labor Relations Act § 2(9), 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1970). In determining whether a labor
dispute is present, moreover, "[t]he wisdom or unwisdom of the men, their justification or lack of it"
cannot be utilized as determinative factors. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 344
(938).
... NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 234 (1963).
""'National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1970). In NLRB v. Insurance
Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 494-95 (196o), the Court noted that an ordinary economic strike
would not be evidence of a failure to bargain in good faith, and that the reason for that "[i]s not that
it constitutes a protected activity but that ... there is simply no inconsistency between the application of
economic pressure and good-faith collective bargaining."
8 1 See Boys Mkt., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (970) (federal courts may grant
injunction to enforce no-strike clause); NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (939). This will not
be true where the strike is to protest an employer's unfair labor practices. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v.
NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
... Such objectives are noted at note 187 s"pra.
... See, e.g., NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (i96o) ("sitdown" strike); UAV-
AFL Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949) (intermittent work stop-
page); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (i939) (seizure of employer's property). In
determining whether a particular activity will be protected, the basic test is simply whether it would
justify an employer in discharging the participating employees. Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950).
... National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § X52(3) (1970); see NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer
Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967).
1. National Labor Relations Act § xo(c), 29 U.S.C. § i6o(c) (1970).
"0 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938).
1'7 Tampa Sand & Material Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1549 (1962).
188 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
10 See, e.g., NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 380-81 (1967) (if strikers are available
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When professional athletes resort to the strike as a means of coercing their em-
ployer's acquiescence or capitulation to their demands, therefore, they will encounter
a substantial body of law that will determine the permissibility of their actions, and
of their employer's response, as well as the sanctions that may be applied to each.
B. The Owners' Right to Lockout
In contrast to the power of the players to strike, the primary economic weapon avail-
able to the owners is the ability to "lockout"201 -that is, the power to withhold em-
ployment as a means of economically coercing concession or acquiescence at the bar-
gaining table202 Although this power was at one time relatively restricted,203 it is now
quite clear that it is a perfectly permissible means of economic coercion, so long as
bargaining is pursued in good faith and is utilized only after the bargaining process
has reached stalemate or impasse.
The permissible extent to which the lockout may be employed is best illustrated
by American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, °4 where an impasse had developed after
good-faith bargaining, and fearing that the union would call a strike at the most
profitable time of the year, and thus produce the greatest economic leverage, the
employer locked the employees out until an agreement was reached some two months
later. In upholding the employer's action, the Supreme Court observed that the use
of a temporary layoff solely as a means of bringing economic pressure to bear upon
the employer's bargaining position, after an impasse had developed in a good-faith
for reinstatement, the employer cannot hire new employees absent a legitimate and substantial business
justification); NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967) (cannot accord vacation
benefits depending upon strike activity); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 232-37 (1963)
(cannot accord "super-seniority" to those who did not remain on strike); NLRB v. Mackay Radio
& Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 346-347 (938) (failure to rehire those who were active in the strike).
... See, e.g., NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 3o6 U.S. 240, 252 (1939); Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 449 F.ad 511, 513 (5th Cir. 197).
It is also to be noted that what began as an economic strike may become an unfair labor practice
strike. See NLRB v. Waukesha Lime & Stone CO., 343 F.2d 504, 508 (7th Cir. r965). See generally
Stewart, Conversion of Strikes: Economic to Unfair Labor Practice (pts. I & 2), 45 VA. L. REV. 5322
('959), 49 VA. L. Rav. 1297 (1963).
"' In addition to the lockout, the employer may also permanently replace economic strikers, see notes
198-2oo supra and accompanying text; terminate his entire business, see Textile Workers Union v.
Darlington Mfg. CO., 380 U.S. 263 (1965); institute unilateral changes in working conditions, see Local
i55, Int'l Molders & Allied Workers v. NLRB, 442 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 197) (though here such
change was "inherently destructive," and, as such, impermissible); or stockpile supplies and products to
withstand a work stoppage, see American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965).
2"- See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 92-93 (957); Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96
N.L.R.B. 268 (i95x).
... This relatively restricted permissibility was the result of the fact that the Board held lockouts to be
presumptively unlawful, except in single-employer lockouts, see Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B.
268 (1951) (to avert immobilization of autos brought in for repair); International Shoe Co., 93 N.L.R.B.
907 (i95i) (to forestall "quickie" strikes); Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.LR.B. X335 (943) (to avoid
spoilage due to sudden work stoppage); Link-Belt Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 227 (940) (to prevent sit-down
strikes, and in multi-employer situations where a "whipsaw"-strike tactic was utilized by the union).
See Buffalo Linen Supply Co., io9 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954), rev'd sub nom. Truck Drivers Local 449 v.
NLRB, 231 F.2d ino (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 87 0957).
284 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
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bargaining effort, would not be an unfair labor practice.205 This practice would
not, it said, interfere with the right to bargain collectively2 .. or the right to strike '°
and would not of itself be evidence of a discriminatory animus toward the union in-
volved2 s Although there was considerable objection on the Court to the majority's
opinion, 09 American Ship does accord to employers a potent economic weapon with
which to wage economic warfare. This was made even more clear by NLRB V.
Brown,210 a companion to American Ship, in which the Court upheld the temporary
use of non-union personnel to replace union members locked-out by a multi-employer
group after a union had struck one of its members?'1 It has also been indicated that
a pre-impasse lockout may be justified if a good-faith bargaining effort is present?'
Use of the lockout is not, however, without limitation. In analyzing its use in
particular circumstances, the primary inquiry will be the motivation of the employer
for its utilization?' 3 When it is used defensively-that is, when it is used only to
defend against actual or threatened union action-as it was in American Ship and
" Id. at 308-18.
20' The right to bargain collectively, the Court observed, "does not entail any 'right' to insist on
one's position free from economic disadvantage." Id. at 309.
... In this regard, the Court observed that
It is true that recognition of the lockout deprives the union of exclusive control of the timing
and duration of work stoppages calculated to influence the result of collective bargaining negoti-
ations, but there is nothing in the statute which would imply that the right to strike "carries
with it" the right exclusively to determine the timing and duration of all Vork stoppages. The
right to strike as commonly understood is the right to cease work-nothing more. No doubt a
union's bargaining power would be enhanced if it possessed not only the simple right to strike
but also the power exclusively to determine when work stoppages should occur, but the Act's
provisions are not indefinitely elastic, content-free forms to be shaped in whatever manner the
Board might think best conforms to the proper balance of bargaining power.
Thus, we cannot see that the employer's use of a lockout solely in support of a legitimate bar-
gaining position is in any way inconsistent with the right to bargain collectively or with the
right to strike.
Id. at 310.
258 Although the Court did note that the locked-out employees would suffer economic disadvantage,
it added that "there is nothing in the Act which gives employees the right to insist on their contract
demands, free from the sort of economic disadvantage which frequently attends bargaining disputes."
Id. at 313. See also NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 196a); American Brake
Shoe Co. v. NLRB, 244 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1957).
21 In concurring opinions, one by Mr. Justice White, 380 U.S. at 318-27, and the other by Mr.
Justice Goldberg, joined by Chief Justice Warren, id. at 327-42, it was, essentially, stated that the facts
of American Ship justified the result, but that the Court should not have utilized such broad language
to reach it, inasmuch as other cases would not be quite so clear.
510 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
2
"" Id. at 288-9o. In reaching this opinion, however, the Court was careful, as it was not in Amer-
ican Ship, to tie its decision to the facts at hand. Id. at 287-88. See generally Oberer, Lockouts and the
Law: The Impact of American Ship Building and Brown Food, 51 CoRNL.L L.Q. 193 (i966).
212 See Darling & Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 8oi (1968), enforced sub nom., Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1ao8
(D.C. Cir. x969).
13 Thus, in American Ship, the Court observed that
Proper analysis of the problem demands that the simple intention to support the employer's bar-
gaining position as to compensation and the like be distinguished from a hostility to the process
of collective bargaining which could suffice to render a lockout unlawful.
380 U.S. at 309. See also NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 32-34 (967); NLRB v. Brown,
380 U.S. 278, 28992 (1965); Inland Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 562, 565 (7th Cir.), cer denied,
404 U.S. 858 (971); Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 12o8, 12io-i2 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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Brown,214 the lockout is clearly permissible under a motive inquiry, inasmuch as a
defensive motivation will ordinarily be economic. Where the lockout is used offensive-
ly, however, the motivation is more likely to be non-economic. Thus, although the
lockout has been allowed as an offensive measure, the employer may not couple it
with the use of non-union replacements, since that would be inherently destructive
of the employees' rights and would not serve any legitimate business purpose21
Similarly, the lockout will be unlawful if used by an employer who demonstrates a
hostility to the principles of collective bargaining,21 who has engaged in bad-faith
bargaining,2" or who uses the lockout as a means to avoid bargaining,218 to inter-
fere with the union organizational efforts,21 9 to retaliate against striking employ-
ees,2 2 0 or to punish those engaged in union activities," or if it is used by an employer
who has no substantial business interest to justify his action.222 In short, when the
lockout is inherently destructive of employee rights and does not support a legitimate
and substantial business interest of the employer, it will be unlawful. 2
As is the case with the players' right to strike, when the owners seek to use the
lockout, there will be a wealth of authority with which to evaluate the permissibility
of their action under the circumstances. Since there is nothing in the nature of pro-
fessional sport that would justify exceptional rules, the ordinary strike-lockout rules
of industrial labor relations will apply with full force to economic warfare in sporting
disputes-as will all the rest of the federal labor law. The alert adversary will, there-
fore, familarize himself with these rules before his opponent makes resort to this
economic arensal, since that familiarization may tell him that such resort might, un-
der the circumstances, be unlawful. Armed with such knowledge, he will be better
prepared to make intelligent, strategic, and lawful use of his own economic weapons
once the warfare commences.
214 Thus, in American Ship the lockout was in response to a threatened, and feared, strike during the
peak business season which would cripple the business, 380 U.S. at 303-04, and in Brown the union
had already struck one member of the multi-employer group. Id. at 281. See Inland Trucking Co. v.
NLRB, 440 F.2d 562, 564-65 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (I971).
21 See Inland Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 562, 564-65 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858
(1971); NLRB v. Bagel Bakers Council of Greater New York, 434 F.2d 884, 888-89 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 908 (I971).
.1. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 309 (1965).
" See NTRB v. Bagel Bakers Council of Greater New York, 434 F.2d 884, 888-89 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 9o8 (971).
21" See, e.g., NLRB v. Tak Trak, Inc., 293 F.2d 270 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 938 (x961).
See also NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 93 n.I8 0957).
219See, e.g., NLRB v. Somerset Classics, Inc., 193 F.2d 613 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 816
(2952); NLRB v. Long Lake Lumber Co., 138 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1943).
2
" See NLRB v. Golden State Bottling Co., 353 F.2d 667 (gth Cir. x965).
22 See, e.g., Saginaw Aggregates, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. No. 104, 1971 CCH NLRB Dec. 23, 202
('971).
22 See NLRB v. David Friedland Painting Co., 377 F.2d 983, 988-89 (3d Cir. 2967); see also News-
paper Drivers & Handlers' Local 372 v. Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, 404 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.
2968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 923 (2969).
22 See Local 155, Int'l Molders & Allied Workers v. NLRB, 442 F.2d 742, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Lane
v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 12o8, I22 (D.C. Cir. 2969).
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article has been to illustrate the types of problems which
may arise once the principles of collective bargaining are applied in full force to the
professional team sport industry. Based upon the present attitudes and actions of
players and owners alike, it does not seem that either have as yet come fully to grips
with the impact of collective bargaining on their industry.
As was said at the outset, once they enter bona fide and full-blooded collective
bargaining, the parties should find themselves literally in a new ball game. No longer .
will owners, or their managers, be able to treat the players as their children, at
least not without the players' consent at the bargaining table; no longer will owners
be able to trade, blacklist, or otherwise harass the union's player representatives, at
least not without subjecting themselves to unfair labor practice charges and other
"labor" remedies; and no longer will either side be able to shield their intransigence
on particular issues by claiming that the issue in question is not bargainable, for
in the collective bargaining arena all issues are in the realm of good-faith debate.
When agreements are negotiated, individual players should no longer be able to
invoke the antitrust laws to challenge agreed upon provisions because so long as their
bargaining agent has met its duty of fair representation to the majority of players
in the bargaining unit, there should be a complete defense against the challenge.
Players must, then, air their grievances through the agreement-established procedures
and in accordance with NLRB dictate-that is, unsatisfied expectations must seek
vindication via internal, not external, proceedings.
Change can also be expected to take place in the internal dynamics of the players
associations, which should enable them to more adequately meet the needs of all
ballplayers, stars and journeymen alike. The basis of such internal realignment might
be a realization that the main purpose of any employee organization is to represent
those who, on their own, lack bargaining power to stand against the adversary.
Thus, more interest in the journeymen, non-star ballplayer may become apparent,
especially when it is considered that the bargaining agent's primary duty is to the
majority which is unlikely to be composed of superstars. This theory is the corner-
stone of the American labor movement, and to expect it to at some point find fruition
in the sports industry would hardly be prophetic.
In short, as the players and owners continue to align themselves in the adversary
posture of labor-management negotiation, it is only inevitable that their every move
should be judged by the standards of the National Labor Relations Act. The in-
vocation of these standards, moreover, portends far reaching change in the heretofore
paternal relation of the owner and the player, as well as the sibling relation of star
and journeyman. This change will surely cause relative upheaval in these several
relations. Given the stakes in this ball game, one waits with avid expectation for
the unfolding of this new chapter in American commercial relations.
